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I. INTRODUCTION
Some thirty years ago, American society awoke to a fundamental
flaw in the status quo. Existing patterns of economic activity, law
and policy left certain widely-shared values unprotected. In
particular, human health and the environment were suffering
unprecedented and unacceptable degradation. The legal and
policy response to this awakening was a dramatic and prolonged
one: the enactment and implementation of a massive structure of
statutory law, beginning with the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).1
In the thirty years since NEPA's enactment, statutory
environmental law2 has become a fixture of the American legal
landscape. We have moved from outrage over the absence of laws
adequate to protect environmental quality and human health to a
systemic and institutionalized recognition of such laws' necessity
and desirability.3 Whether to eliminate all of our environmental
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
2. I use the term environmental law to describe the vast realm of law, largely statutory,
that addresses human actions affecting the rest of the natural world. Although the contours
of environmental law are somewhat murky, most can agree that laws dealing with pollution
control (including waste disposal and the regulation of toxic substances) form part of
environmental law. I also include within my definition of environmental law the related field
commonly known as natural resources law, encompassing, for example, wetlands and
endangered species protection. The laws that compose this vast body are commonly dubbed
"environmental" laws presumably because the motivating force behind new laws was public
pressure for greater consideration of the environment. And although they incorporate
attention to non-human elements of the natural world previously lacking in statutes, they are
better characterized as focused on human interaction with the environment.
3. For example, in a 1994 poll, 76% of Americans polled supported legislation to insure
that businesses protect the environment. SUSAN MITCHELL, THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO
AMERICAN AYrITUDES 98-101 (1996). Fifty-seven percent supported government regulation
of individuals' activities to insure that we protect the environment even if it interferes with
peoples' right to make their own decisions. Id. at 99. The 1992 Health of the Planet Gallup
survey found that 62% of Americans rated environmental problems as the most important in
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laws is not a frequently asked question; the need for some
environmental laws is a given.
One might take the volume of law, as many people do, as proof
that our society shares some set of values or norms governing
human interactions with the environment, what we might call an
"environmental ethic." 5 We may even assume that this ethic is at
least partly reflected in the law.6 This article suggests, however, that
the nation or as "very serious." RILEY E. DUNLAP ET AL., HEALTH OF THE PLANET, Table 1
(1992). Ninety percent favored stronger environmental protection laws for business and
industry. Id. at Support for Stronger Laws for Business and Industry (unpaginated section). More
recent polls suggest that this level of support has lessened considerably to about 50% of the
population in the last five years. See infra note 162.
4. Even the strongest supporters of market-based approaches generally focus their
critique on the command-and-control regulatory approach and seem to accept a role for law
and government both in creating markets for desired public goods and providing incentives
for desired conduct. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental
Protection, 55 MONT. L. REV. 425, 427, 432 (1994). While not a "market purist" himself,
Huffman also articulates the purist view that rejects government intervention, focusing
largely on eliminating political interference with markets. Id. at 430-32.
5. In this article, I refer frequently to the related concepts of "value(s)," "ethic" and
"environmental ethic." I use the term "environmental ethic" to describe a set of principles
and justifications for distinguishing good from bad human conduct insofar as it affects the
environment. See BARBARA MACKINNON, ETHICS: THEORY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 5
(1995); G.E. Moore, The Subject Matter of Ethics, in CONTEMPORARY ETHICS, SELECTED
READINGS 21, 24 (James P. Sterba ed., 1989). In the study of ethics generally, philosophers
identify values and analyze the justification and merit of principles derived to explain why
those values are good. See MACKINNON, at 5-6. I use the term ethic to denote the set of
principles that implement and justify a given set of values. Ethics and environmental ethics
in the plural sometimes refer to more than one such ethic, but they can also refer to the
disciplines that study ethics and environmental ethics. When referring to these academic
fields, I will capitalize the terms Ethics and Environmental Ethics for clarity. By the term
value or values, I refer to something about which one cares, which caring may motivate one's
conduct. For example, human autonomy, aesthetic beauty, avoidance of pain for sentient
creatures, human health, and biodiversity are all values. Acting consistently with a set of
values is one element of seeking the "good." "[E] thics aims at discovering correct reasons for
thinking this or that is good." Moore, at 21 (discussing why the most critical question is what
is meant by good). Ultimately, when we examine why someone has an ethical position
regarding a particular action, analysis of its justification and merit takes us back to a question
of something of value-something we care about. James Rachels, Can Ethics Provide
Answers?, in APPLIED ETHICS AND ETHICAL THEORY 3, 18-20 (David M. Rosenthal & Fadlon
Shehadi eds., 1988). So for example, a biocentric rights-based ethic reflects a number of
values that an individual might hold that are justified by a certain theory about the value of
all life forms and their entitlement to respect. In this article, I also use the term ethic in a
non-technical sense that may be closer to Aldo Leopold's use of the term-to refer to the
amalgam of values that exist not in a particular individual's mind, but which as a society we
have in fact adopted and are enacting by virtue of adopting and implementing our laws.
6. This approach of finding an ethic through the study of how we conduct ourselves
seems consistent with Anna Peterson's focus on environmental ethics as "lived ethics." See
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despite this impressive consensus and legacy, it is not clear that
environmental laws do reflect any clearly articulated ethic that
should be called environmental. As a nation, we lack an adequate
understanding of the values that undergird these laws.
Characterizations by advocates often attribute ethical content to
these laws, but few have seriously analyzed (or critically challenged)
these assertions.7 It may be that the ongoing development of law in
this area is in fact impeded by the lack of such an understanding."
The aim of this article is to explore whether and how we can
know if our laws relating to the environment accurately reflect
values held by a majority of people. Such a massive body of law
must reflect something. 9 Thus, this article posits the value of a
ANNA L. PETERSON, ON BEING HUMAN: ETHICS, ENVIRONMENT AND OUR PLACE IN THE WORLD
4-5 (2001).
7. Yet, with increasing frequency, the goals of environmental laws have been challenged
as being in conflict with other values, such as the right to property or human freedom and
autonomy. Environmental law has also been challenged increasingly as extremist, in part
because of scientific uncertainty, but also because it conflicts with other human values. See
GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH: THE COMING AGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
OPTIMISM (1995); BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE
REAL STATE OF THE WORLD (2001). These are serious attacks and merit serious attention.
But little groundwork has been laid for a public debate of these issues.
8. Others have made observations consistent with this contention. See, e.g., Michael P.
Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to Link Environmental Targets
in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 861-64 (1996-97) (criticizing a command-and-control
regulatory approach in part for its failure to cope with underlying uncertainties about
values); Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep: Bringing Environmental Values Back into the Fold
with a New EPA Decisionmaking Paradigm, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4-5, 13 (1999) (detailing the
inadequacy of benefit-cost analysis as a tool for considering the full range of values
implicated by environmental decisions); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Ethical Strands of Environmental
Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 843. Richard Delgado's critique of the public trust foundation
of modern environmental law also suggests that the public trust theory approach has
forestalled coming to terms with environmental problems. Richard Delgado, Our Better
Natures: A Revisionist View ofJoseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some
Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (1991).
9. In using the term law, I refer not just to the statutes, but also to the statutes as
implemented through regulations, judicial decisions, and enforcement and implementation
decisions. Others have demonstrated how statutes that apparently embody a strong value of
health or environmental protection may not protect that value when implemented. See, e.g.,
John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990). Dwyer
focuses on the pressures inherent in the political and legislative processes that produce
strong but intentionally unenforceable commands to protect human health and the
environment. However, debunking the notion that these statutory commands can be taken
at face value and that they are the complete expression of the values embedded in the
statutes, is only a first step. The question remains, what values are in fact embedded in the
laws as written, interpreted, and implemented. This article argues that we need a more
comprehensive analysis focused explicitly on the values that underlie our laws and
regulations.
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concerted effort by legal scholars to articulate more clearly the
values and ethics that underlie our environmental laws and that are
promoted by them."° The premise is that, as a democratic society,
our laws in some measure reflect the public's values and ethics, and
if they do not, we may seek to reform them.' If we are ignorant of
the values that our laws serve, our ability to participate in the
democratic process is impaired. 12 If lawmakers and regulators are
also ignorant of the values that their laws, regulations and
enforcement and budget decisions advance, then there is a failure
of accountability by these public officials that ought to concern us.
It is time we ask ourselves these obvious, but frequently
overlooked questions. Are our environmental laws simply
extensions of the ethical structure of our tort, property and
criminal law, designed to protect person and property from certain
insults not adequately addressed under the pre-existing common
law? Or are they "environmental" laws in another sense, in that
they embody a special valuing of the environment, a different
ethical stance toward the environment not found in other laws? Do
they help us distinguish between social and anti-social conduct in
some different way than other laws, a way that accounts for the
environment particularly? Or do they merely reflect the morality
that governs all other human conduct?
Some may argue that this inquiry is not needed, that we already
know what values environmental laws seek to promote. From this
view, it is obvious what we care about: clean air, clean water,
endangered species, or environmental protection. 3  However,
10. The research agenda this question invites is descriptive rather than normative. It
focuses on identifying the values we currently express through our laws rather than arguing
that we ought to pursue a particular set of values.
11. I assume here and accept that vast inadequacies and failures exist in our democratic
process that prevent the direct translation of majority values into law.
12. Richard Lazarus has made a similar observation with regard to the Supreme Court's
inability to develop a coherent environmental law jurisprudence. Richard J. Lazarus,
Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV.
703, 706, 748-51 (2000). He targets the Justices' failures to recognize the unique values at
stake in environmental cases as a critical factor that has constrained the development of a
coherent body of law in this area.
13. The easy answer to why we care about the environment, as expressed in statutes and
public debate, is frequently a litany of different reasons for caring, including aesthetic,
scientific, recreational, health, safety and the catchall "human welfare" values. Rights of
future generations may be invoked along with those of present generations, and the value
inherent in non-human elements of the environment may even be mentioned. This easy but
superficial response to why we care, frequently echoed in the preambles to our laws, is
2003]
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these values and the reasons for caring for them are not given
equal weight by the laws enacted to advance them. Further, the
litany often omits economic wealth, autonomy and freedom-
values recently highlighted in environmental policy and law debate
by property rights advocates. Yet our statutes and their
implementation are often as heavily influenced by these hidden
values as by the more prominently featured environmental values. 14
The superficiality and inadequacy of our knowledge of the values
embedded in these laws becomes still more apparent when we ask
why we care about the environment. Even if the list of values were
complete and its elements always compatible, any particular value
on the list may be compatible with several different theories of why
we care. 6  To understand the ethic underlying our laws, we must
uncover not just the objects of concern but the bases for our
concern. Without a better understanding of why and to what
extent we value species and how that compares with our valuing of
economic activity or some health, safety or welfare interest, we have
said little about what we value that will be helpful in practice.
Very different policy and legal implications may ensue depending
on which theory best explains our social intuition in favor of
protecting, for example, endangered species.' 7 So identifying the
ethics that explain a given law or policy may help us to determine
whether the law is accomplishing its purpose and may help to guide
decisions about reform.
inadequate. I will focus my discussion largely on the issues posed by resource protection
statutes like the wetlands provision of the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act
because they pose the greater ethical challenge for us. Statutes that are more directly,
although not exclusively, focused on human health, like the Clean Air Act, raise more
traditional ethical questions. Although I will not use these statutes as examples in this piece,
the same problem and need for further work exists.
14. William F. Pedersen, "Protecting the Environment'--What Does that Mean?, 27 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 969, 972 (1994) explains how the American predilection for single-statute responses to
problems, as opposed to development of a true national policy in response to environmental
problems, enables us to avoid resolving these questions of conflicting values. Pedersen urges
scholars to describe utopian visions of what environmental protection could mean as an aid
to promoting this type of policy discussion. Id.
15. See Rachels, supra note 5, at 20.
16. When we identify "species" or "wildlife" as values, is that because we view them as
having inherent value? Or because they are instrumentally valuable for economic and
recreational purposes? Or because we believe we owe some duty to future human
generations?
17. For the view that debate on this question may not be essential, see Freyfogle, supra
note 8, at 844 n. 74.
[Vol. 28:1
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The project I describe builds on, but is distinct from, the work of
most environmental philosophers. This article doesn't enter into
or comment on the lively debate over environmental philosophies.
Nor does it imply that environmental lawyers need to become
environmental philosophers. '  Rather, it suggests that awareness
and development of individual and societal environmental ethics is
critical to sound development of law and policy and that better
translation of our laws into a language of ethics is needed to
facilitate this process. In contrast with philosophers' efforts to
develop plausible and coherent ethical theories, 9 this article
advocates a role for legal scholars, looking at our laws in action to
determine the content of society's ethics in practice. Rather than
engaging in the creative effort to envision a coherent ethical
framework, I advocate that we look in the mirror at our current
relationship to the rest of the natural world and determine what
ethics are embodied in our current laws and policies, however
incoherent and partial they are.20 Having surveyed the work done
to date at the intersection of environmental law and ethics, I
conclude that we have reached a point at which a more systematic
inquiry into the ethics of our law is both possible and necessary.
18. For those with an interest, the effort spent to acquire some familiarity with the
literature is well rewarded. However, as is noted infra p. 83, many of the theories debated by
philosophers reflect ethics that are clearly removed from the ethics expressed in our laws
and embraced by the dominant American culture today. Nonetheless, for those seeking
ideas on how our ethics may evolve, the literature provides guideposts towards which
conservation-oriented individuals may aspire.
19. Part IIA describes in greater detail the work undertaken by philosophers in theory-
building as well as other aspects of the work of environmental philosophy.
20. My use of the term "ethic" to refer to something that is expressed through law but
latent and therefore not consciously intended or chosen freely by any given person may give
philosophers in the modern Kantian tradition pause. This use of the term ethic may be
consistent with the definition accepted by ancient classical philosophers, and with Aldo
Leopold's concept of ethics as "a kind of community instinct in-the-making," a mode of
cooperation to promote survival. ALDo LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC WITH OTHER
ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION FROM ROUND RIVER 238-39 (Sierra Club / Ballantine 1966). The
terminology is not essential. Indeed, if one adopts the modern view of ethics as only
descriptive of a set of values freely and consciously chosen, the importance of the work I
describe may become even clearer. What I perceive as our lack of knowledge about the
values we are promoting or expressing through law means not just that our ethic is latent or
we are unconscious of it, it means that we lack an ethic. Until we become cognizant of the
values or moral implications of the choices we are making as individuals, both in our actions
under the laws and through our indirect responsibility for the law, we are by definition
acting without a coherent environmental ethic. I am grateful to my colleague Charles
Collier for pointing out the problematic nature of the use of the word ethic in this context.
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To extract the environmental ethics embedded within, our laws
must be examined both as drafted and implemented. The ethical
content of our laws results from a dynamic process of lawmaking
that continues even as we study it. 2  One cannot simply look at the
hortatory statements of policy in a statute and accept them as
stating "an ethic., 22 Even scholars who are intimately familiar with
an area of law may not know and may not have tried to identify with
precision the ethics embedded in the laws they study. To the
extent that some scholars have addressed this question, the inquiry
is often limited. My goal is to suggest the value of systematic
attention to this question, to indicate how the work done to date
has set the stage for the project and to begin to envision the work
involved.
23A preliminary analysis of several core environmental provisions
suggests that the mix of values embedded in our environmental
statutes is substantially similar to the values found in the common
law and non-environmental statutes. That is, the environmental
statutes tend to reflect human concerns that predate any dawning
of environmental awareness-with only a modest introduction of
new values or reasons for caring that are uniquely attributable to
concern for the human relationship to the environment.14 If this is
true, it seems to undermine a tenet of the public debate. It may
call into question the very naming of these as "environmental" laws
21. Note that I am not advocating the dynamic approach to statutory interpretation when
I use the term dynamic. See William Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 1479 (1987). Whatever method one adopts to interpret the statutory text, I am
interested not just in the text of statutes, but the meaning the statute develops as it is
implemented.
22. Indeed it is not clear whether these reflect something that could be fairly called an
ethic even if one adopts the view that an ethic can exist outside an individual's conscious
choice of a path. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the ethic or ethics we have
embraced in our laws appear to be nuanced, not absolute, and perhaps inchoate or
incoherent. If this is correct, deriving and describing them requires a serious inquiry that
bridges law and philosophy.
23. My initial focus has been the law governing the dredging and filling of wetlands
under section 404 of the Clean Water Act and the "take" prohibition of the Endangered
Species Act, along with the provisions that qualify and implement these provisions. Other
scholars' general assessments are consistent with this conclusion. Seesupra note 8.
24. This is a preliminary impression that requires more work to confirm or correct it.
Indeed, the goal of this essay is to make the case for the need to undertake this type of
analysis. I do not take a position on whether the ethic should be truly "environmental." My
contention is that it is almost impossible to know whether or not these laws accurately reflect
our values as a democratic society. Until we know more precisely what values the laws
currently reflect, we are only guessing at what non-technical reforms are needed.
[Vol. 28:1
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and their easy identification with "environmentalism" and
environmental ethics. Apart from this, my goal is to focus attention
on the nature of the values included and those excluded from
consideration under our various laws. I envision a study of the
process by which our law and our values evolve. This study should
enhance our understanding of the law and of the role of various
institutions in the development of both the law and its ethical
content.
To begin the inquiry, this article considers how work already
being done in Environmental Philosophy relates to the work I
describe. Part II introduces the subject known as Environmental
Philosophy or Environmental Ethics and shows how the concepts
and vocabulary particular to the field may provide a starting point
for a more rigorous discourse about the ethics underlying
environmental law. Part III surveys the relevant work to date by
legal scholars, highlighting its specific relevance to the synthetic
analysis I argue is needed. Part IV sets out in more detail the goals
and scope of the search for environmental ethics and describes one
approach to uncovering the ethics embedded in our law. Part V
suggests why our understanding of the ethics of our environmental
laws is so limited, and argues for committing greater effort to
developing the connection between environmental law and ethics.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
An important threshold question is how this search for the ethics
embedded in our laws relates to the well-studied topic of
Environmental Ethics. This section briefly introduces the field of
philosophic inquiry and then briefly describes the work being done
by some philosophers and its relationship to the work I propose.
A. Environmental Ethics and Its History
For purposes of this article, Environmental Ethics is defined
broadly, to describe the morals that humans adopt in their
interactions with the non-human natural world. However, some
25. I use the term "environmental ethics" in a broad and non-technical sense, to refer to
any ethical theory or group of theories that accounts for or applies to human interactions
with non-human nature in a way that ethical theories focused exclusively on human
interactions do not. For purposes of clarity, I capitalize the term "Environmental Ethics" to
refer to the study of environmental ethics. Some have suggested that the term
Environmental Philosophy may be more accurate to describe the field often called
20031
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philosophers who work in the field of Environmental Ethics use the
term more narrowly to describe a coherent theory of morality to
govern human interactions with the environment that could
eliminate the perceived social harm that these interactions
26currently generate. In other words, in theorizing about
Environmental Ethics, philosophers seek to create new theories or
apply existing ones creatively to solve what they see as a
philosophical lacuna-the absence of ethical approaches that
directly consider the ethical dimensions of human relationships
with the natural environment.2 1 One philosopher has described
the field of Environmental Ethics in this way:
Although ethics traditionally has been the branch of philosophy
concerned with the criticism and proper ordering of values governing
interactions among persons, the values that have fueled our
environmental crisis are norms not so much of personal interaction
as of interactions between nature and human society generally.
Because of this difference, a new branch of ethics has been initiated
to oversee our dealings with the rest of nature."'
Environmental Ethics, because the academic literature is not focused primarily on applied
ethics, but on other traditional fields within philosophy, such as aesthetics, metaphysics,
epistemology, philosophy of science, and social and political philosophy. EUGENE
HARGROVE, FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 2 (1989). Others have used the term
ecophilosophy, or Arne Naess's term "ecosophy" to describe the more radical and expansive
approaches to environmental philosophy, like deep ecology, which demands that "we...
understand the nature of the problems in terms of the interrelationships between our
desires, concepts, beliefs, characters and cultures, and how these produce technology
practices and lifestyles that affect on [sic] the Natural world in various ways." DONALD
EDWARD DAVIS, ECOPHILOSOPHY: A FIELD GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE xii, xix (1989). I won't
draw this distinction.
26. Joseph DesJardins offers a useful definition:
[E]nvironmental [E]thics presents and defends a systematic and comprehensive
account of the moral relations between human beings and their natural environment.
Environmental [E]thics assumes that human behavior toward the natural world can be
and is governed by moral norms. A theory of environmental ethics then must go on to
(1) explain what these norms are, (2) explain to whom or to what humans have
responsibilities, and (3) show how these responsibilities are justified.
JOSEPH R. DESJARDINS, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 13 (1993). However, some philosophers
argue that no single ethic or ethical justification will emerge or need emerge for
environmental ethics to have an important role in our social development. See CHRISTOPHER
D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM (1987) (envisioning
the possibility of moral pluralism as the future of environmental ethics); see also HARGROVE,
supra note 25, at 8.
27. As Eugene Hargrove states in his introduction to Foundations of Environmental Ethics,
[P]hilosophy has traditionally refused to acknowledge or directly face up to the physical
existence of the Earth." Id. at 3.
28. Kenneth M. Sayre, An Alternative View of EnvironmentalEthics, 13 ENvTL. ETHICS 195-96
(1991) (arguing that the pressing need to which environmental philosophy should respond
[Vol. 28:1
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Whether one defines environmental ethics narrowly or broadly,
the root concept is a set of principles and justifications for
distinguishing good from bad human conduct insofar as it affects
the environment.' 9 The study of Ethics and of Environmental
Ethics involves an identification of values, and then an analysis of
the justification and merit of the principles derived to advance
those values. Ultimately, when we examine why someone has an
ethical position regarding a particular action, analysis of its
justification and merit takes us back to a question of value-of
what we care about-such as pleasure, or protecting life. Indeed,
values lie at the heart of an inquiry into ethics. One can study
ethical questions with a focus on individuals' ethics and behavior or
on the ethics of groups of people, or the ethics or values expressed
through social institutions, like law.s2
is not the need for more theories or for agreement among philosophers on the best theory;
rather we need to replace the norms that have led society to environmental degradation with
others that are less degrading).
29. Ethics is a branch of philosophy that deals with questions about what is good or right
and how we know what is good or right. See MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 5; Moore, supra
note 5, at 21. "[E]thics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all
things that are good." Id. at 24. In the study of Ethics, people give reasons that support
their argument that a given thing is good or bad. MACKINNON, supra, at 5-6. "[T]he main
object of Ethics, as a systematic science, is to give correct reasons for thinking that this or that
is good. ... " Moore, supra, at 21 (in the course of discussing why the most critical question
is what is meant by good).
30. The essence of ethical discourse is a rational inquiry into the justification for a course
of conduct or adoption of a principle to distinguish good from bad conduct. These rational
explanations and arguments are tested against our moral intuitions. See SHELLY KAGAN,
NORMATIVE ETHICS 13 (1998). "Ethics, or moral philosophy, asks foundational questions
about the good life, about what is better and worse, about whether there is any objective
right and wrong, and how we know it if there is." MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 5. In the
study of ethics, people give reasons that support their argument for a given choice. Id. at 5-
6. Facts, feelings and emotions may all play a role in the judgment as to what is good in
Ethics. Id. at 6. The facts provide an empirical basis for our judgments. But our feelings
and emotions may play a role in our morality too, shaping our values. Id.
31. Rachels, supra note 5, at 18-20.
32. See supra note 20. Aldo Leopold's often-quoted definition focuses not on the
possibility of varied ethics adopted by individuals, but on ethics as they develop and are
expressed socially. His definition searches out the ecological analogue for human ethics:
An ethic, ecologically, is a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence.
An ethic, philosophically, is a differentiation of social from anti-social conduct. These
are two definitions of one thing. The thing has its origin in the tendency of
interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation. The ecologist
calls these symbioses. Politics and economics are advanced symbioses in which the
original free-for-all competition has been replaced, in part, by co-operative mechanisms
with an ethical content.... An ethic may be regarded as a mode of guidance for
meeting ecological situations so new or intricate, or involving such deferred reactions,
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Within the discipline of philosophy, most say that Environmental
Ethics is a branch of applied Ethics, like bio-medical Ethics or
business Ethics. 3 Applied Ethics often involves inquiry into how
general ethical principles are applied in fields involving complex or
controversial questions. 4 Environmental Ethics, then, is concerned
with the principles that distinguish good from bad in human
conduct that relates to the environment, the justification for
considering given conduct as good or bad, and the values that
underlie the definition of what is good. A particular decision or
action can be tested against a given environmental ethic to see if it
in fact serves the values of the ethic and if the outcome of the
decision challenges the coherence or logic of the ethic.35
that the path of social expediency is not discernible to the average individual. Animal
instincts are modes of guidance for the individual in meeting such situations. Ethics are
possibly a kind of community instinct in-the-making.
LEOPOLD, supra note 20, at 238-39.
33. See, e.g., HARGROVE, supra note 25, at 1. Other scholars distinguish applied ethics (the
application of existing ethics to unique environmental problems) from (1) "extensionism"
(the extension of duties to other species, e.g., animal liberation) and (2)the ecocentric
"nothing less than a sweeping philosophical overhaul" to incorporate ecology into
philosophy. See J. BAIRD CALLICOTf, IN DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC: ESSAYS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 2-4 (1989).
34. KAGAN, supra note 30, at 3. Others, like Eugene Hargrove, describe Environmental
Ethics as more diaphanous. To Hargrove, the many topics studied in the field called
Environmental Ethics spill over into other branches of philosophy unlike other branches of
applied Ethics. HARGROVE, supra note 25, at 2. On this view, an environmental ethic, if one
truly develops, will disappear into the fabric of philosophy. An environmental ethic's
maturity will be signaled not by a new set of rules, but by a transformation of aesthetics,
metaphysics, economics, etc. to take account of the unique characteristics and values
embodied in our relation to the natural world. Id. at 2-3. In short, the disappearance of a
separate ethic, its integration into our broader sense of ethics, will mark its true success.
35. Some may mistakenly understand Environmental Ethics as a futile search to identify a
set of principles that will provide clear and certain answers to any interaction or situation.
While some philosophers may work to identify and refine a single ethic, the enterprise is
much broader than this. Eugene Hargrove offers interesting insight into the content and
meaning of an ethic. Instead of thinking of ethics in terms of a set of principles or rules by
which society evaluates right from wrong conduct, Hargrove draws on the work of Adriaan
de Groote, who analyzed the role of textbook strategies that operate as "rules" in chess, to
elucidate how ethical rules operate in practice. See HARGROVE, supra note 25, at 5-8 (citing
THOUGHT AND CHOICE IN CHESS 90 (George W. Baylor ed., 1965)). Hargrove uses the term
rules to describe not the rules that define the game of chess, but common "textbook"
strategies that are "useful because they produce good results when we follow them," such as
the "rule that it is better to trade a knight for a bishop than a bishop for a knight, since the
value of a bishop increases during the game as its mobility increases and the value of a knight
decreases as it becomes more vulnerable to attack." Id. at 6.
De Groote's work demonstrates that effective rules are not necessarily consciously or
expressly invoked and rigidly followed. In his research, De Groote discovered that above-
average chess players may know and employ common textbook rules about how best to gain
In Search of an Environmental Ethic
Environmental Ethics provides a necessary foundation for the
work this article advocates. However, a close look at the substance
of the work done by environmental philosophers highlights the
divergence between Environmental Ethics and the intellectual
effort I envision. The work done by philosophers in this field often
involves an effort to expose and develop one or more possibleethial .36
ethical theories, or the justifications or foundations for such
theories, that could govern human-non-human interactions.
Traditional ethical theories are viewed as either insufficient or
incoherent when applied to human interactions with the non-
human world and as justifying destructive patterns of human
conduct. In general, writing about Environmental Ethics focuses
on developing new ethical theories that are in some way appropriate
to govern human relations with the rest of the natural world, that
are informed by ecology or an awareness of elements of nature, or
that will promote a beneficial relationship with the rest of the
natural world.
To this end, environmental philosophers engage in an ongoing
debate about candidate environmental ethics: their justification in
logic; their consistency with our moral intuition, our history, our
cultural and social traditions; and their implications for our
an advantage, but that the effect of the rules is to "unconsciously affect perception during
the decision-making process." Rather than dictating an inevitable outcome, the rule helps
to improve the player's perception of the situation, and may act as an aid to learning or "as
principles of justification" to which players advert in explaining choices they made. See
HARGROVE, supra note 25, at 6; see also KAGAN, supra note 30, at 2-3 (describing how the
application of normative ethics to a controversial situation may be difficult and the correct
outcome may not be apparent). In other words, ethics can perform an important function
by helping us to see problems, even if they are only partial tools for solving these dilemmas.
This explication of the role a chess rule plays seems to present a more useful picture of how
an environmental ethic would operate than does the conception of an ethic as a rigid set of
rules.
36. "An ethical theory is a systematic exposition of a particular view about what is the nature
and basis of good or right. The theory provides reasons or norms forjudging acts to be right
or wrong and attempts to give ajustification for these norms." MACKINNON, supra note 5, at
8.
37. See, e.g., ALAN R. DRENGSON, Foreword to ECOPHILOSOPHY, supra note 25, at xiii-xiv
(defining the measure of depth of an ecophilosophy in terms of "its capacity to create
practices, traditions, cultures and characters which are able not merely to exist, but to dwell
and flourish on this Earth"); CALLICOTr, supa note 33, at 3-4 (describing his work and that
of other "ecocentric environmental philosophers" as a response to seeing the need for a
radical change in philosophy in response to nature's repudiation of modern Western
civilization's attitudes toward and valuing of the environment).
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ongoing conduct."s The work of these philosophers can help us in
our quest to understand the ethics embedded in our laws in several
ways. First, this work provides important background by inquiring
into the implications of applying traditional human-centered ethics
to human relationships with the non-human world. Second, these
philosophers explore and theorize about alternative ethics. These
ethics are based on alternative ways of, and justifications for,
valuing the environment that may already be incorporated in our
laws or at least somewhat compatible with them. This work-
building new theories and identifying candidate values-is
particularly likely to help lawyers and legal scholars to develop a
vocabulary for a deeper discourse about the values and ethics of
our laws.
What follows is a brief survey of (1) some of the formative writing
on Environmental Ethics, (2) examples of work by philosophers
that bridges ethics and law, and (3) an introduction of some core
concepts that anchor philosophical debate. 9 These concepts and
terminology may form the basis for a vocabulary that can be used in
the effort to extract and identify the ethical strands, as Eric
Freyfogle has aptly called them, 4° embedded in our laws.
38. Within the field of environmental philosophy, scholars can pursue quite different
endeavors. Professor DesJardins categorizes these as: descriptive ethics, normative ethics
and philosophical ethics. Supra note 26, at 14-15. Description or classification of the ethics
held by a person or group of people is an endeavor that has been called "descriptive ethics."
Id. at 14-15. Normative ethics includes the type of debate where competing "oughts" are
argued as the proper norms for conduct. Id. at 15. This has also been described as
concentrated on "presenting and defending a moral view." KAGAN, supra note 30, at 2.
Normative ethics is also concerned with attempting to derive a basic set of moral principles,
or some of the most important ones and defending them. These principles may be rights,
duties or virtues. Id. at 2. Philosophical ethics, or metaethics, operates at "a higher level of
generality and abstraction in which normative judgments and their supporting reasons are
analyzed and evaluated." DESJARDINS, supra note 26, at 16; see also KAGAN, supra note 30, at 4.
In metaethics, philosophers evaluate the merits or limitations of various ethics, to locate
them in relation to general philosophical theory, or to clarify concepts and their potential
application to a given problem by focusing on the strength of their factual premises, their
internal coherence and consistency, etc. DESJARDINS, supra note 26, at 16. Finally,
philosophers may also engage in theory building, the most abstract and creative type of
thinking about environmental ethics. Id. at 16.
39. What follows is only a partial survey of leading thinkers and approaches whose work
has had early or enduring impact on the legal discourse about environmental ethics. For a
more complete, but dated, survey, see DONALD EDwARD DAVIS, ECOPHILOSOPHY: A FIELD
GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE (1989). Thejournal Environmental Ethics remains a leading site of
academic dialogue and the website and quarterly Newsletter of the International Society for
Environmental Ethics include an indispensable bibliography. Http://www.unt.edu/ISEE.html.
40. Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 828.
In Search of an Environmental Ethic
1. Formative Writings
Aldo Leopold was one of the first conservationists to suggest the
need for an "ethic" that addressed our relation to the natural
world.4' In his Foreword to A Sand County Almanac, in 1948,
Leopold wrote:
Conservation is getting nowhere because it is incompatible with our
Abrahamic concept of land. We abuse land because we regard it as a
commodity belonging to us. When we see land as a community to
which we belong, we may begin to use it with love and respect. There
is no other way for land to survive the impact of mechanized man,
nor for us to reap from it the esthetic harvest it is capable, under
science, of contributing to culture.42
In "The Upshot" Leopold argued that the key to remedying our
flawed relationship to the land (a strictly economic relationship
"entailing privileges but not obligations") was the development of
a "land ethic. 43 In Leopold's words:
A land ethic, then, reflects the existence of an ecological conscience,
and this in turn reflects a conviction of individual responsibility for
the health of the land. Health is the capacity of the land for self-
renewal. Conservation is our effort to understand and preserve this
capacity.... A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity,
stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it
tends otherwise."
In the early 1970's, Environmental Ethics began commanding
attention among scholars of religion and philosophy. Lynn White's
article The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,45 and then John
Passmore's book Man's Responsibility for Nature,46 carried forward the
scholarly discussion.4 7 By the late 1970' S, 4s a number of academic
41. Leopold's work has influenced the debates about environmental ethics both among
philosophers and legal scholars. See, e.g., CALLiCOTr, supra note 33; J. BAIRD CALLIcoTr,
BEYOND THE LAND ETHIC: MORE ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (1999); Eric T.
Freyfogle, The Land Ethic and Pilgrim Leopold, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 217 (1990).
42. Leopold, supra note 20, at xviii-xix.
43. Id. at 238.
44. Id. at 258, 262.
45. Lynn White,Jr., The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis, 155 SCI. 1203 (1967).
46. JOHN PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE: ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND
WESTERN TRADITIONS (1974).
47. Both of these works focused on how elements of the religious and cultural traditions
of the West, specifically Judeo-Christian beliefs and morality, shaped human relations with
the rest of the natural world. Their writings contributed to the early debate over whether
industrial western society was in some measure programmed by its existing ethics to degrade
and destroy the natural world, or whether some alternative ethic was either latent or even
potentially consistent with existingJudeo-Christian ethics, a topic still debated today.
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philosophers had begun working on problems of philosophy
related to the environment.49 Around this same time, the term
"environmental ethics" gained currency to describe both a special
type of ethics or values that an individual or society might develop
and the academic study of that topic.
During this period, Mark Sagoff and Christopher Stone
undertook significant work that bridged the gap between
philosophy and law. In a series of articles," Sagoff responded to
the strong emphasis on economic efficiency in public policy and
law debates. He argued that environmental problems are not
properly conceived as problems of market failure, that they are
primarily "moral, aesthetic, cultural, and political." , 1 Thus, Sagoff
rejected the trend toward favoring reliance on cost-benefit analysis
to direct environmental policy. In the concluding chapter of his
book collecting his early writings, Sagoff addresses most directly the
question of the values underlying our environmental statutes. He
canvasses the relative priority accorded to human health protection
and other competing values under several statutes.52
Christopher Stone explored whether an environmental ethic
should incorporate values then excluded by our legal system,
particularly by the limited recognition of parties with standing.53
48. Other authors and thinkers concerned with this topic can be identified throughout
history. For example, Passmore notes Victor Hugo's conviction that a new ethic to govern
human relations with nature would develop in time. PASSMORE, supra note 46, at 3.
49. One prominent figure within this group, Eugene Hargrove, founded the journal
EnvironmentalEthics in 1979, which represented a landmark in the development of the topic
as a field of professional interest.
50. These were later collected in MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH:
PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988).
51. Id. at 6. Sagoffs work sought to establish a dichotomy between what he termed
consumers' preferences and citizens' values and to argue for the need for debate in terms
that reflected the latter. Sagoff sought to establish that values, not market failures, were the
motivation for environmental statutes and that selection of societal values through a
deliberative process is an important part of our tradition of liberty. Id.
52. SAGOFF, supra note 50, at 196-98. Contrary to some who argue for absolute
protection of these values, Sagoff ultimately argues for incorporating consideration of
competing values into our deliberation. Id. at 210-24. Sagoff focused his attention on the
proper approach and values to incorporate in implementing statutes. Therefore his inquiry
focused on the relevant values expressed in the bedrock language of the statutes, where
competing values may not be explicit. Id. at 201-02. Nonetheless, he seems implicitly to
accept that these competing values are legitimate, and advocates their incorporation
through limited consideration of the costs that protection of environmental values demands.
He rejects an ethic that imposes a duty to prevent all environmental degradation. Id. at 218-
20.
53. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM
In Search of an Environmental Ethic
Stone rejects "moral monism," the quest for a single unifying body
of principles that reduces the identity of what has moral
considerateness to one quality,54  and instead posits "Moral
Pluralism" as a position that enables us to conceive of moral
standing and duties as variable. 5  Bryan Norton, another
philosopher whose work has emphasized convergence rather than
theoretical monism, has consistently sought to bridge philosophy
and ecological science, in the quest to inform policy development.
56
A number of other philosophers have sought to bridge the gaps
between environmental science, philosophy and policy or law. For
example, Laura Westra begins with the goal of biological integrity
articulated in various pieces of legislation. Westra then develops a
new moral theory to fit the stated legislative goal which challenges
existing morality.5' Kristin Shrader-Frechette undertakes detailed
analysis to uncover the values embedded in risk assessment policy 8
and in decisions applying these policies.59 Her work highlights
instances where claims to scientific objectivity obscure the
imposition of particular values ° and where the values articulated as
guiding a given decision are in fact not well served due to flawed
methodology and data.61 This convergence of the issues addressed
(1987). This book explores more broadly the reach of law and morals in dealing with things
other than human individuals. Id. at 11-12. It also surveys how and why the law might
expand "legal considerateness" to a broader range of entities. Id. at 43-62.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 115-18, 132-37. These include spatial and temporal distance between actors,
duties to other humans and to other species, and whether questions relate to character or
actions. Id. at 13, 120-24, 132-52, 205-40. In a later book, CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE
GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN AGENDA (1993), Stone notes
how law, to be effective, must draw on morals. Id. at 242. Stone also notes the role that
education "in both fact and spirit" can play in effecting change to our ethics and law. Id.
56. See, e.g., BRYAN G. NORTON, TOWARD UNITYAMONG ENVIRONMENTALISTS (1991).
57. LAURA WESTRA, AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSAL FOR ETHICS: THE PRINCIPLE OF
INTEGRITY (1994). Westra argues that legislation incorporating integrity as a value signals a
public inclination toward an ethic centered on this novel value. Id. at xvi. She then explores
how her principle of integrity could be operationalized in law and policy as a new moral
imperative. Id. at 6.
58. Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Evaluating the Expertise of Experts, 6 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY
& ENV'T 115 (1995).
59. Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Academy Recommendations on the Proposed Yucca Mountain
Waste Repository: Overview and Criticisms, 8 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 25 (1997).
60. Shrader-Frechette, supra note 58.
61. Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Justice and Procedural Safeguards: The Ethics
of Environmental Restoration, 42 ARiz. L. REV. 525 (2000); Shrader-Frechette, supra note 59.
Ultimately, Shrader-Frechette calls for a "practical ecology" that relies on case studies rather
than general theory. Shrader-Frechette, Practical Ecology and Foundations for Environmental
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by scholars in philosophy and law highlights the timeliness of an
effort to systematically assess the role of ethics in our law.
2. Core Concepts from Environmental Philosophy
As the inquiry by environmental philosophers has grown broader
and deeper, certain concepts have taken on central importance.
The now-common philosophical axes of anthropocentrism versus
biocentrism and rights-based or deontological approaches versus
utilitarian or consequentialist approaches serve as important
landmarks in discussing environmental ethics. Some writing adopts
an iconic approach, locating ideas in relation to John Muir's
preservationism or a conservationism identified with Gifford
Pinchot or Aldo Leopold's land ethic. An understanding of these
core concepts and how they fit into the debate among philosophers
may help us to develop a common vocabulary that will promote
deeper inquiry and dialogue.
Anthropocentric utilitarian ethics suggest that our guiding principle
of the good should be to maximize welfare for humans. Incidental
protection of non-human nature reflects "the good" only insofar as
it advances humans' interest or values.2 Such an approach is
rejected by the majority of environmental philosophers as
inherently insufficient to address the problem of human relations
with the non-human environment. Nonetheless, an
anthropocentric utilitarian ethic is a familiar justification for many
regulatory statutes, including many environmental laws.
Some environmental philosophers, including Bryan Norton, have
worked to develop variations on the anthropocentric utilitarian
ethic that correct the deficiencies that have led to conservation and
ethical dilemmas.63 These theories-which seek a way to measure
costs and benefits that takes into account the limitations of market
economics, as well as our knowledge about the interdependence of
elements of the environment, our imperfect information and
methods for understanding the non-human world, and the need
Ethics, 92 J. PHIL. 621, 635 (1995). She suggests a path towards conservation that protects
humans and human welfare by shifting the burden in cases of uncertainty to those who
maintain that an action has no adverse effects. Id. at 632.
62. See, e.g., BRYAN G. NORTON, WHY PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY (1987) (surveying
anthropocentric utilitarian arguments for preserving species); HARGROE, supra note 25, at
9-11 (characterizing his approach as focused on anthropocentric intrinsic value arguments).
63. See, e.g., NORTON, supra notes 56, 62.
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for a coherent response to uncertainty-may best be captured by
the phrase ecological utilitarian ethics.
Anthropocentric ights-based ethics-ethics that are grounded in
respect for the rights of humans-are less frequently candidates
for an environmental ethic among environmental philosophers
because they represent the characteristic exclusion of nature from
philosophy. By definition, this type of ethic cannot be "fixed" to
incorporate the non-human world. Nonetheless, for purposes of
developing a vocabulary, an anthropocentric rights-based ethic is
an important concept since many of our laws are arguably
consistent with such an ethic.64 Moreover, the recent interest in
environmental justice suggests the desire to reincorporate
distributive justice-a notion grounded in an anthropocentric
rights-based framework-into the ethics that guide our
environmental laws.
Important discussion of biocentric or lifeform-centered ethics has also
flourished in the environmental philosophical debate, focusing on
ethics that posit rights for, or other valuing of, non-human natural
entities. 65 The term biocentric ethic is sometimes used to refer
specifically to a holistic biocentric ethic-an ethic that makes wholes,
such as species or ecosystems, rather than individuals, primary.
Biocentric theories often embrace values and justifications that
diverge sharply from the traditional human-centered ethics they
seek to expand and thus are rarely represented in current
American environmental law.
Aldo Leopold's land ethic is perhaps the most widely known
holistic biocentric ethic; it has been widely cited and its
ramifications and potential applications developed by many
64. An ethic consistent with Western traditions and philosophy, grounded in aesthetic
appreciation for nature and scientific attitudes, which the author identifies as "weakly
anthropocentric," is posited by Eugene Hargrove in his book Foundations of Environmental
Ethics. See supra note 25, at 10, 11. This particular focus on the intrinsic value of nature and
the values associated with scientific inquiry and aesthetics can be subsumed within our
human-centered ethics, though they represent an intrinsic value approach rather than one
focused on rights.
65. See, for example, CALLICOTr, IN DEFENSE OF THE LAND ETHIC, supra note 33, at 3-4
(characterizing his view as ecocentric). Deep ecology would also be considered a biocentric
ethic. These and other ethics that focus on the collective of lifeforms that comprise an
ecosystem or all forms of life are distinguished from ethics focusing on rights of or duties to
individual creatures, such as the animal rights perspective of Tom Regan. See infra notes 69-
70 and accompanying text.
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philosophers, including Baird Callicott and Holmes Rolston.66 In
Leopold's formulation, the land ethic is grounded in a conception
of community that embraces both humans and other elements of
the land community. It is encapsulated in his maxim, "A thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of
the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. 67 This
ethic embraces a redefinition of the relationship between humans
and the non-human world in which humans are not conquerors
but citizens alongside all other members of the "land-
community." 68 The land ethic employs the insights of ecology as a
guide for determining the good for this broad ecologically-linked
community. For purposes of identifying whether strands of this
ethic exist in our laws, we might distinguish this ethic as an
ecological communitarian ethic. It explicitly eschews utilitarianism and
locates the good in the stability, integrity and beauty of the
community as a whole. It is the community whose interests we
must look to in guiding our conduct, not the rights of individual
members of the community.
Individualistic biocentric theories that invoke rights for non-human
individuals (animal rights) have been described and advocated by
Peter Singer 69 and Tom Regan. ° Theories that embrace respect
and duties short of rights for a broader range of life forms include
Paul Taylor's theory outlined in Respect for Nature.1
The thinking of Arne Naess is at the root of deep ecology, more
recently termed Ecosophy-T, which outlines a process of deep
questioning about nature and oneself. Deep ecology has
subsequently been embraced and widely written about by others
and is part of an important strain of debate regarding
66. See CALLICOTT, supra note 33; HOLMES ROLSTON III, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: VALUES
IN AND DUTIES TO THE NATURAL WORLD (1988) (developing the case for an ethic reflecting
the intrinsic value of nature and incorporating ecological focus on the community rather
than the individual).
67. LEOPOLD, supra note 20, at 262.
68. Id. at 240.
69. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 1 (2d ed. 1990).
70. TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983).
71. PAULW. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1986).
72. See, e.g., Arne Naess, The Deep Ecology Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects, 8 PHIL.
INQUIRY 10 (1986); BILL DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY: LIVING AS IF NATURE
MATTERED 7-8 (1985) (describing the process as one of cultivating ecological
consciousness); see also WARWICK Fox, TOWARD A TRANSPERSONAL ECOLOGY (1990).
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environmental ethics that reflects a fundamental critique of
Western industrial society.
Ecofeminism describes a theoretical approach to human-nature
interactions that seeks to highlight the parallel between male
oppression of women and oppression of nature, and which draws
on this commonality in seeking alternative modes of interaction.7 s
Others have theorized environmental ethics with more explicit
spiritual dimensions.
In undertaking to analyze the ethical content of our current laws,
these coherent environmental ethics, both new and old, may
provide a useful starting point by describing various ethical
impulses-bundles of values that our laws advance or with which
they are arguably consistent. 75 Of course, these ethical frameworks
are all avowedly aspirational. They are efforts to envision an ethic,
not to describe what is embraced by the majority today. Therefore,
the ethics described above tend to be far more ecological and to
reflect a greater valuing of the non-human world than do our
current laws. Nonetheless, the terminology derived from
Environmental Ethics may help orient us, and the theories
advanced by philosophers may serve as useful beacons, marking out
points on the ethical landscape in relation to which we can locate
our position and consider our next steps.
B. Building a Vocabulary
We currently lack a sufficiently nuanced vocabulary to enable us
to discuss the values and ethics embedded in our environmental
statutes. The language of Environmental Philosophy focuses on
pure principles and coherent theories that could be adopted by
73. See REWEAVING THE WORLD: THE EMERGENCE OF ECOFEMINISM (Irene Diamond &
Gloria Feman Orenstein eds. 1990) for a collection of essays from varied perspectives,
including Charlene Spretnak, Susan Griffin, Carolyn Merchant, Vandana Shiva and Ynestra
King.
74. See, e.g., DHARMA GAIA: A HARVEST OF ESSAYS IN BUDDHISM AND ECOLOGY (1990).
75. A provision of a given law will often be consistent with several different ethical
theories, not just one. For example, a prohibition on the taking of members of endangered
species, standing alone, could reflect a biocentric ethic or an anthropocentric utilitarian
ethic. Absent the rare statement of an ethical principle within the law, one can only identify
the various candidate ethics with which the law is arguably consistent. However, both
because of the vast differences among the environmental ethics that have been theorized,
and because implementation decisions may further refine the ethical content of the law, one
can still draw significant distinctions and gain insight into our ethical bearing from the effort
to articulate the ethics embedded in our law.
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humans. To talk about the somewhat messier and perhaps
dysfunctional bundles of values and justifications underlying our
statutes and decisions, we need a slightly different vocabulary.
The paradigms of utilitarian and rights-based ethics, and of
anthropocentric and biocentric approaches, are useful anchor
concepts. 7 6 For instance, the values reflected in our environmental
laws are often consistent with some variant of an anthropocentric
ethic. But this insight does not take us far. Identifying them as
anthropocentric reveals little about the precise values promoted or
the possible justifications for caring. The extent to which the
values reflected in the statute diverge from those that would
underlie a pure anthropocentric utilitarian or rights-based ethic is
enlightening and important, and often cannot be explained by any
coherent pure philosophy. Without a supplementary vocabulary to
differentiate the ethical impulses that underlie our laws, it is hard
for a broad discussion to develop about them.
To fill this gap, I offer a provisional list of "ethical impulses" that
supplements the existing terminology. These ethical impulses are
not ethics in the philosophical sense, but provide (1) a shorthand
to describe bundles of values that frequently appear embedded in
our environmental laws and policies and (2) an associated
justification for caring that may be a variant of a true ethic (such as
anthropocentric utilitarianism), or in some cases may lack the
coherence of an ethic. A single statutory provision and its
implementation may be consistent with one or several impulses.
The ethical impulses I propose are as follows.
77
1. The Nuisance Impulse (Utilitarian or Rights-Based)
The Nuisance Impulse invokes an anthropocentric ethic that
replicates and advances the values protected by the common law
nuisance doctrine. The term signals that the statute or rule in
question mimics the limited array of values that nuisance law
typically protects-human health, safety and property-and also
that the consideration of these values may be limited by common
law standards of proof and concepts of causation. Thus, the term
76. The four pairings: anthropocentric rights-based, anthropocentric utilitarian,
biocentric rights-based and biocentric utilitarian ethics are useful starting points and provide
some vocabulary to help us describe ethics embedded in laws. Arguments grounded on the
intrinsic value of non-human nature represent an important variant of these approaches.
77. The list is not intended to be definitive. It is a first step, not a final product.
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also suggests at best a limited incorporation of ecological principles
such as interdependence and scale and a relatively crude approach
to uncertainty.
In seeking to analyze the ethical impulse of a statute that
advances this limited array of values there are two distinct possible
answers to the question of why we care about human life, health
and property sufficiently to limit another property owner's rights.
The answer may reflect a rights-based or a utilitarian justification,
either concern for protecting human autonomy or the goal of
achieving the greatest good for the greatest number.
The term Utilitarian Nuisance Impulse may best capture the
blend of values considered in a utilitarian balancing that
approximates the cost-benefit balancing sometimes performed
under common law nuisance doctrine. If the statute protects
human health, safety or property, without explicit consideration of
costs, then the statute may be said to be consistent with a Rights-
Based Nuisance Impulse. Under either variant, as under nuisance
law, disruption of aesthetic or spiritual values associated with the
non-human world that does not cause physical injury to humans or
interfere with a human right to use property is not discouraged.
2. The Ecological Utilitarian Impulse
An Ecological Utilitarian Impulse underlies standards that
incorporate a broad and ecologically-informed measurement of
relevant costs and benefits; it is an anthropocentric utilitarian ethic,
but one that incorporates the insights of ecology. Many statutory
standards that embody a traditional utilitarian ethic lack any
explicit mandate for consideration of attributes like
interdependence, irreversibility, and uncertainty. Decisions under
such standards generally reveal similar inattention to ecological
science. An Ecological Utilitarian Impulse differs from this
traditional utilitarian approach in that the decisionmaker accounts
for these scientific insights in evaluating the social utility of a
course of action. Because of the limits of human knowledge and
analytic techniques, one might fairly claim that no utilitarian
assessment can comprehend all the ecological costs and benefits of
a particular action or decision. Therefore, the term Ecological
Utilitarian Impulse describes analyses or standards that
approximate this ideal, taking account of current limitations on
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human understanding and endeavoring in some way to overcome
them.
3. The Sustainability Impulse
The notion of sustainability, while still evolving, may capture an
array of values and a justification for caring about them that differs
from the impulses described above, while similarly not rising to the
level of a coherent philosophical ethic.78 This ethical impulse
emerges from the central focus of sustainability-ensuring that
decisions satisfy current needs without compromising the ability of
future generations to provide for themselves, taking into
consideration social equity, environmental protection and
economic development. A decisional process promoting a
Sustainability Impulse distinguishes itself from a traditional
anthropocentric rights-based or utilitarian ethic in that it would
dictate consideration of the rights of future generations and would
be ecologically informed. Yet, the Sustainability Impulse differs
from an Ecological Utilitarian Ethic in that concern for the
environment is motivated by a desire to preserve values for future
generations in a context of social equity. Like the related
intergenerational equity approach developed by Professor Edith
Brown Weiss,79 a law embodying a Sustainability Impulse is focused
on the rights of humans. The explicit focus on economic
development reveals the extent to which sustainability represents a
variant of a traditional utilitarian approach applied within the
current global economic context.
4. The Land Ethic Impulse
The Land Ethic Impulse evokes a biocentric communitarian
ecological ethic that values stability, integrity and beauty of the land
community, including humans. It values non-human life forms as
members of the community along with humans and explicitly
incorporates the insights of ecology. A law that incorporated this
ethical impulse would incorporate a valuing of individuals and
groups because of their relationship to and role in the land
78. See, e.g. William D. Ruckelshaus, Toward a Sustainable World, 261 SCI. AM. 166 (1989).
79. EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW,
COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989); see also Bryan G. Norton,
Intergenerational Equity and Environmental Decisions: A Model Using Rawls' Veil of Ignorance, 1
ECOL. ECON. 137 (1989).
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community. It explicitly rejects a purely human-centered utilitarian
approach. The privileging of beauty suggests that despite this
biocentrism, human cultural values inevitably form a part of the
idea of the good.
5. The Development Impulse
The term Development Impulse may be useful to describe a
statutory command or a decision that reflects a narrowed
anthropocentric impulse that may be grounded in either a rights-
based or utilitarian tradition, but is narrower than either and lacks
a broader philosophical coherence. The Development Impulse
reflects a privileging of human activity that alters the non-human
natural world. This may be justified by a narrow focus on the rights
of the individual to undertake development activities (without
regard to other humans' rights that may be affected) or it may
reflect a very narrow assessment of costs and benefits that weighs
heavily the benefits of development activity without accounting for
external or spillover costs.80
6. The Environmental Justice Impulse
An Environmental Justice Impulse can be used to describe a
statute or decision that incorporates considerations of
distributional justice, social equity and fairness among humans.
This impulse is anthropocentric in that it reflects human valuing of
other humans rather than human valuing of non-human elements
of the environment and generally is justified by a focus on rights
rather than social utility. It is environmental in that it dictates
fairness in the distribution of the benefits and burdens that result
from policies and laws that govern human activities that affect the
environment. It does not dictate a particular outcome in terms of
the quality of the environment, but only that the distribution of
environmental quality and human health and safety be fair. Thus,
an Environmental Justice Impulse only indirectly affects human
relations with the non-human world and will always be paired with
80. John Sprankling's analysis of the effect of the law of adverse possession on land
preservation in An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 816 (1994),
and Fred Bosselman's description of the ethic of opportunity epitomized by Justice Scalia in
Four Ethics: Order, Reform, Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENvrL. L. 1439 (1994) both capture an
impulse akin to this Development Impulse.
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some other environmental ethic or impulse. It is consistent with,
but more narrowly focused than, the Sustainability Impulse.
Following a survey of legal scholarship relevant to environmental
ethics, we will return to this proposed vocabulary in an illustration
of how it might help in the effort to uncover the ethical strands of
environmental law.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS IN THE LEGAL LITERATURE
In the early years of the development of our modern
environmental laws, debate on their ethical content and
justification received prominent public attention, in much the
same way as assisted suicide and surrogate parenthood captured
public attention following more recent high-profile, novel
conflicts."' Like the legal-ethical dilemmas involving these other
social issues, the conditions that inspired the development of
environmental law posed a challenge to society. Public outrage
over the burning Cuyahoga River 8 2 , the oil-soaked seals in Santa
Barbara83 and the exposure to hazardous waste at Love Canal
84
suggested a dramatic conflict between American society's ethical
impulses and a legal regime that provided little environmental
protection. As in the other legal-ethical dilemmas described above,
the Golden Rule provided no complete answer to how we ought to
conduct ourselves in relation to the air, water and other species in
these situations. The myriad possibilities for an ethical foundation
for environmental law seemed open to us, and scholars debated
81. Some early examples include Martin H. Krieger, What's Wrong with Plastic Trees, 179
SI. 446 (1973) (suggesting the use of technology for the creation of artificial environments
through substitution and simulation) and the response: Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to
Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974)
(rejecting the argument that plastic trees are beneficial and setting forth a new
environmental ethic); Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?- Toward Legal Rights
for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1970) (proposing that environmental objects
should have legal rights).
82. Environment: The Cities: The Price of Optimism, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, at 41 (discussing
Cuyahoga river water pollution and ignition as a result of waste dumping).
83. Gladwin Hill, Santa Barbarans Wait for Oil 'Powder Keg' to Blow Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
1969, at A10 (informing about oil pollution in Santa Barbara including the oil-soaked seals).
84. Joseph Dunmire & Mrs. Joseph Dunmire, Every Mother is Scared to Death, NIAGARA
GAZETTE, April 27, 1980 (discussing the fears of citizens living near Love Canal); Mike
Brown, Evacuation of Kids Urged, NIAGARA GAZETTE, Aug. 27, 1978, at Al (discussing the
declaration of Love Canal as an emergency situation).
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them as part of the discourse on law.85 The flourishing of ideas,
however, was brief.
Apparent agreement that we needed to change the way we did
business to account for the environment may have truncated any
useful debate about why we cared, how much we cared and how
these newly expressed values related to values already espoused by
society and our laws. Politicians fell over one another seeking to
claim credit for environmental laws that protected health, safety
and the environment. By the late 1970's, as the skeleton of our
laws took shape, the public and legal scholars shifted their focus to
the implementation process: Were the laws being implemented
appropriately? What results were being achieved in practice, what
unforeseen obstacles encountered? As we reached the 1980's and
1990's, the necessary task of improving the regulatory tools for
implementing the sea of environmental laws occupied legal
scholars with questions about the potential of tools like emissions
trading, habitat conservation planning and cost-benefit analysis,
and broader questions about how better to integrate science into
our regulatory processes. Issues about the proper role of risk
assessment and the problems of command-and-control statutes and
no-risk standards became a central focus of scholarship and law
816
reform.
The power of economics and markets as tools to account for
individuals' preferences in decisionmaking carried the day and
persuaded many that they could even substitute for any messy
discussion of values.87 However, some legal scholars continued to
focus on questions about the ethics underlying our statutes
explicitly, 8 or implicitly.89 In recent years, a resurgence of interest
85. See supra note 81 (discussing Krieger, Tribe, Stone).
86. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1333 (1985).
87. See Huffman, supra note 4. The argument is that if our laws incorporate cost-benefit
analysis as a basis for decisions, and if people's values are expressed in those analyses, then
we can reflect society's ethics through our decisions without identifying or debating the
abstract ethical principles that underlie the laws and the individual decisions. See SAGOFF,
supra note 50, at 99-123, for a discussion and critique of this. Professor Rose, although
embracing the value of economics as a tool for expressing individual preferences, see Carol
M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations Of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value By
Any Other Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1631 (1989) (reviewing SAGOFF, supra note 50),
also emphasizes the role of morality in shaping norms. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking
Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DuKE L.J. 1 (1991).
88. See infra notes 94-123, 137-149 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
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has produced a considerable body of work by legal scholars that
incorporates a focus on environmental ethics. These works have
laid important groundwork and renewed the dialogue about the
relevance of ethics to the past and future evolution of
environmental law.
The recent growth in this field suggests a spreading awareness of
the relationship between ethics and environmental law. However,
though analyses of the values embedded in the common law of real
property have been done, similar work on the values underlying
our statutory environmental law is quite limited and scattered. The
survey that follows first categorizes the existing legal scholarship on
environmental ethics to highlight both the contributions it makes
to the inquiry I propose and the extent to which it differs from it.90
In addition, it seeks to describe how both environmental ethics
scholarship and environmental law scholarship that is not explicitly
focused on ethics can contribute to the larger project I propose.
Among the different approaches I identify, I first look at work
that recognizes and advocates greater attention to values. Second, I
identify scholars who use ethical theories in the course of
advocating a particular interpretation or reform, work I call "ethics
advocacy." A third group, which I call "theory builders," includes
those who, like environmental philosophers, have focused on
developing ideal theories that promote a more harmonious
relationship with the non-human environment or better
incorporate what we know about the environment."1 A fourth
group I call "norm theorists" has incorporated a discourse about
social norms into its analysis of legal provisions and tools. 92 I also
identify a fifth group of writings that incorporates close analysis of
the meaning of laws as enacted and as implemented. This careful
systematic analysis is a significant piece of the work needed. It lacks
a translation into a language of values and ethics, but provides the
systematic close reading of law and the study of the impact of
implementation and enforcement that is essential to uncovering
the values embedded in our laws as implemented. The last group,
whose work I call "ethics analysis," has undertaken to identify the
90. This survey is not comprehensive, but provides a sense of the major voices in legal
scholarship about environmental ethics. As will be apparent, a number of authors' works fall
in more than one of these categories.
91. See infra notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 117-123 and accompanying text.
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values underlying law, much as I advocate, but has focused largely
on the common law of property.93 This group has identified ethical
themes in the history of American land law, translating the
meaning of property law into a vocabulary of ethics. Included in
this last group, I note some of the many scholars whose work
contributes somewhat to this analysis, while not systematically
considering the relationship between ethics and law.
A. Recognizing the Challenge
Among the legal scholars who focus on environmental ethics,
several seem explicitly or implicitly to acknowledge the project I
describe. In The Ethical Strands of Environmental Law, Eric Freyfogle
articulates the challenge:
In the many laws that deal with the natural environment, society
implements its ideas on how humans ought to interact with the land.
By environmental laws, I mean the rules on owning and using land
and other natural resources, as well as the numerous laws that limit
pollution and toxic substances. By probing these laws and unraveling
their strands, we can gain a new sense of how we have, as a people,
interpreted the value of nonhuman nature and sought to
acknowledge that value in our communal lives.94
Michael Vandenbergh and Victor Flatt have both written about
the absence of a discourse concerning the underlying values
associated with particular environmental statutes. 95 Mary Wood's
Environmental Scholarship for a New Millennium9 6 frames the challenge
for environmental law scholarship in a way that demands an
awareness of underlying values. Holly Doremus also articulates the
need for a broader discourse on environmental values, but takes an
approach similar to that of many philosophers--advocating for a
new and coherent theory that is truly an environmental ethic:
What is needed to foster further progress in nature protection is not a
better explanation of the economic value of nature, but a better
93. See infra notes 130-149 and accompanying text.
94. Supra note 8, at 819-20. As is discussed infra, Freyfogle focuses on particular
controversies as emblematic of certain values and value conflicts and generally characterizes
the extent to which laws incorporate these values.
95. See Flatt, supra note 8; Vandenbergh, supra note 8. Both of these articles critique the
existing framework for decisionmaking under pollution control statutes focusing on the
exclusion of some environmental values. Victor Flatt sets out a series of questions that seek
to identify the relevant values that are at stake in a given regulatory decision. Id. at 17-18.
96. Mary Christina Wood, Environmental Scholarship for a New Millennium, 26 ENVTL. L. 761
(1996).
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explanation of why nature should be protected when economics
points in the other direction. That explanation must come from the
esthetic and ethical discourses, which can address nature's other
contributions to a fulfilling and honorable human life. 97
In a recent article, 98 Richard Lazarus argues powerfully that the
Justices of the Supreme Court have ignored the distinct identity
and character of environmental law as a body of law. Although
Lazarus is not writing explicitly about environmental ethics, his
ultimate conclusion directs our attention toward how we view the
environment-what we value about it and why. Among the
qualities that Lazarus highlights as distinctive about environmental
law is the "noneconomic, nonhuman character" of the injuries.99
Lazarus's concluding observation thatJustices' life experiences may
be the single most important quality affecting their ability to
appreciate the importance and coherence of environmental law'0 0
reflects in part a recognition that the values the Justices bring to
deciding these cases, their appreciation of the ethical dimensions,
may be the missing link to a coherent jurisprudence.
B. Ethics Advocacy
The second category of scholarship, Ethics Advocacy, is the
broadest and involves the most tangential consideration of ethics.
These are writings that begin from a premise that a certain ethic is
either widely shared or desirable and thus a given. The ethic
provides a context for understanding the value of a legal tool or
analysis being advanced. 1°1 So, for example, Leopold's land ethic
may be invoked as a justification for a proposal for legal reform.
This literature draws on ethical concepts solely as a backdrop for
97. Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 65, 70-72 (2000).
98. Richard Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703 (2000).
99. Id. at 748.
100. Id. at 764-66.
101. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A Proposal
for a "Republican" Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444 (1996) (exploring the possibility of a
superagency as a remedy for the inadequate consideration of future generations' interests
under existing agency structures); James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27
ENVTL L. 1243 (1997). Building on the ethic of sustainability, Salzman argues for a baseline
awareness of our level of consumption and how it relates to a goal of sustainability.
Extended producer responsibility is offered as a policy tool that can help to achieve this.
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legal analysis, and limits their role to that of a foil or a motivating
force for advocacy.
C. Theory Building
The approach I call theory-building involves conceptual work.
The scholars who engage in this work seek to articulate what we
might value as a society and why it is desirable, logical and coherent
to hold these values. They draw on the work of philosophers and
other thinkers to advocate adoption of a set of values as a way to
solve the dilemmas caused by current patterns of human
interaction with the non-human environment. Eric Freyfogle has
written extensively about ethics in this way. In Ownership and
Ecology,10 2 he elaborates on the relationship between conceptions of
property and ecological wisdom; The Construction of Ownership,0 3
and The Ethical Strands of Environmental Law,10 4 are calls for a new
vision of the human-land relationship that incorporates respect for
the land in property law and statutory environmental law,
respectively. In much of his work, he explores and builds on the
ideas of Aldo Leopold to advance understanding of what these
ethics mean or could mean for law.100 Several writings by Carol
Rose, also entail theory building. In Given-ness and Gift: Property and
the Quest for Environmental Ethics, Rose draws on the ethical
intuitions that accompany the act of giving and receiving gifts as a
model for an environmental ethic.
0 6
102. Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership andEcology, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1269 (1993).
103. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Construction of Ownership, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 173 (1996).
104. Supra note 40.
105. See, e.g., Freyfogle, supra note 41 (charting elements of Leopold's intellectual and
ethical development as reflected in his writings, exploring why they endure and what they
can teach us). Freyfogle highlights the need for "scholars who can express values with a
clarity, a lyricism, and a sincerity that captivates us and gets us, not just to see and know, but
to feel and experience its rightness." Id. at 255.
106. Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics, 24
ETL. L. 1, 7-11 (1994). An interesting point Rose's analysis raises is the subtle but
significant shift we can make, even within an anthropocentric utilitarian framework, if we tell
a different story about the role of human users. Rose emphasizes the shift in how we value
nature-from a crude commodification to a more spiritual, less hard-nosed valuing-when
we shift from viewing it as a given to a gift. Id. at 11-12. Rose also surveys three different
ethics with what she calls an instrumental purpose. She isn't assessing their inherent merit
or coherence as a philosopher would, but wants to see if they will lead us to a beneficial
environmental ethic-a notion of use with care and respect. Id. at 14, 21. Indigenous
peoples' attitudes offer some benefits, notably a sense of respect for and identification with
nature. Id. at 18-19. However, Rose points out how some views held by indigenous peoples
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Edith Brown Weiss's work developing the intergenerational trust
theory is another example of a groundbreaking exposition of a new
ethical framework.' 7 Richard Delgado's writing has exposed and
assessed the value of several candidate environmental ethics.'08
Joseph Sax's early work in excavating the public trust doctrine and
exploring it in the service of modern conservation law'09 has
generally been viewed as development and application of a new
legal theory. However, it simultaneously created a vision of a rights-
based ethic and should be seen as theory building. The
foundations that support the public trust doctrine point us in the
direction of certain values in the environment and certain reasons
for caring. Indeed, the dominance of this doctrine and idea as a
foundation for modern statutory law may have contributed to the
lack of attention to ethics by legal scholars for some years. We may
have accepted the public trust as an answer to ethical as well as
legal questions, rather than recognizing the questions it doesn't
resolve about what we value and for what reasons. Richard
Lazarus's critique of the doctrine in part seems to hint at this, in its
suggestion that the contours of the doctrine don't cover everything
we need to protect-in other words, everything we value."0
Holly Doremus has also written extensively about the need for a
new ethic and has explored the contours of such an ethic, notably
in The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New
Discourse."' Doremus argues that the rhetoric we use to describe
what we value is an aspect of what we value. She critiques the
rhetoric of values found in the Endangered Species Act and the
are at odds with accepting responsibility for human impacts and with our technical and
rationalistic approach to conservation. Id. at 17-18. Similarly, biocentric rights- or interest-
based approaches may have rhetorical power, although when focused on individual life
forms they raise a number of problems. Id. at 20-24. Ultimately, she locates sources for the
notions she advocates in property law. See Rose, infra note 116, at 742-46.
107. WEISS, supra note 78; see also Edwin R. McCullough, Through the Eye of the Needle: The
Earth's Hard Passage Back to Health, 10J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 389 (1995).
108. Delgado, supra note 8, at 1218-23.
109. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970).
110. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 711-12 (1986). Richard
Delgado criticized the dominance of public trust theory based on its normative force that
may have precluded the development of a more profound ethical foundation for
environmental law. SeeDelgado, supra note 8.
111. Supra note 97. The article considers political rhetoric about the Endangered Species
Act as a form of narrative that may reflect the intuitive elements of our ethic. Id. at 42.
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debate about it, which she sees as inadequate to express the values
of biodiversity."2
Daniel Farber, in his book Eco-Pragmatism, sets out to address how
we ought to reconcile our "environmental values" with other
values."' Farber's work approaches theory-building. His central
proposals could be said to represent an effort to define an ethic of
sustainability or an ecological utilitarian ethic. Although Farber's
ideas are framed more as an analysis of existing legal tools and a
way to resolve conflict, his recommendations 4 can be viewed as
recommendations for operationalizing a sustainability ethic."15  As
such, the recommendations can be viewed as a path for infusing a
new set of values into the interpretation of law.
116
D. Norm Theorists
Carol Rose is the leading norm theorist. In The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,"7 she
draws on the history of common resources in various cultures to
show how customary norms can function as a management
112. Id. at 54-61.
113. See DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 1 (1999). Farber suggests that there may be a need for
society to develop a different approach to environmental problems than is currently
embedded in our laws: one that incorporates cost-benefit analysis tempered by a
presumption in favor of protection. Id. at 11-13, 199-202. His work assumes the existence
of some set of "environmental values" and what he terms an environmentalist baseline. See,
e.g., id. at 3-4, 11, 43, 94, 107-10.
114. These include "leaning into the wind," employing a low discount rate, using an
environmentalist baseline tempered by reasonableness and a green canon of statutory
construction. Id. at 11, 114-16, 138-44, 201-02.
115. See id. at 35-36. Farber's proposals to decentralize and provide for regulatory
flexibility could be argued to cut against an ecological ethic, as the critique of Farber by Lisa
Heinzerling suggests. See Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1421 (2000).
116. Farber presents his ideas more as a solution to a conflict among different world views
and does not suggest that he is advocating or developing a particular ethic, except to the
extent that he is seeking a mediating principle between extreme positions. FARBER, supra
note 113, at 35. He does suggest that a goal of his recommendations is to promote better
understanding of the values underlying environmental conflicts. Id. at 11. But his primary
focus is on whether economics can accurately capture some cluster of environmental values
he does not seek to define. See, e.g., id. at 3-4, 11, 39-44. The values at stake in the principle
examples Farber draws on are largely, though not exclusively, human life and health. This
easy equation of human health and environmental values shows how relatively crude our
discourse about environmental values still is.
117. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 742-46 (1986).
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strategy.1 8 This theme is also developed in Rethinking Environmental
Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources"9 and elsewhere
in her work. 2 0 Jeff Rachlinski's empirical and theoretical work on
the role of social norms contributes to a better understanding of
the limits of social norms as an alternative to regulation in the
context of environmental law.'2 1 Victor Flatt's work also enters the
realm of norm theorizing in the course of discussing the need for
an open discourse on the values underlying environmental law, 22 as
does Holly Doremus's emphasis on this point in Rhetoric and
Reality.
123
E. Close Analysis of Law's Meaning: Legal Scholarship with a
Non-Ethics Focus
As the illustration in Part IV will show, the work to uncover the
ethics embedded in our laws relies not just on attention to the
content of values and plausible justifications for them but also on a
careful study of how our laws operate in practice. To identify what
values predominate under our laws demands that we look closely at
the statutes, as well as regulations, informal guidance, agency
practices, budget priorities and enforcement. Oliver Houck's work
provides the best example of this type of systematic analysis. Houck
studies how agencies and courts have implemented statutes like the
Endangered Species Act 24 and section 404 of the Clean Water
118. See id. Eric Freyfogle has also written about this:
The law of land ownership is one of the cultural elements that expresses our sense of
place in the natural order of life. It reflects our communal understandings of value and
of right and wrong-what land uses we consider harmful; what interactions with nature
we view as appropriate; whether we understand nature as a whole or as a collection of
parts; whether we see humans as part of the natural order or whether nature is merely
backdrop and resources; and whether the future does or does not weigh heavily in our
accounting schemes. As new members become part of a culture, they absorb many of its
values. The law of ownership therefore does more than reflect a set of values: it helps
instill them, and carries them on.
Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77, 109 (1995).
119. Rose, supra note 87, Rethinking Environmental Controls.
120. Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory,
Feminist Theory, 2 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 37 (1990) (storytelling can promote the trust necessary
to create norms that will be followed).
121. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Protectiong Endangered Species Without Regulating Private
Landowners: The Case of Endangered Plants, 8 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1998); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537 (2000).
122. Flatt, supra note 8, at 16.
123. Doremus, supra note 97.
124. Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
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Act. 12' Although presented without explicit reference to any
discourse on environmental ethics, Houck's work provides a factual
context for interpreting the values embedded in practice in our
environmental statutes. 126  Houck's writing reveals the values at
stake, the values considered and those excluded from
consideration.
The encyclopedic work of treatise writers like William Rodgers
provides this detail on a larger scale.127  Other examples of legal
scholarship that provide detailed information about the
implementation of environmental law include Ann Carlson's
empirical work on the impact of social norms on recycling 28 and
Jeffrey Rachlinski's empirical study of the impact of state
endangered-plant regulation on landowner behavior 19 This type
of scholarship will be instrumental in evaluating the values
undergirding environmental law in operation.
F. Ethics Analysis
Ethics analysts focus on the ethical underpinnings of law and
legal development. Their work comes closest to the undertaking I
advocate. However, much of the work of this type to date has
focused on "land law," the common law of property or land use.
Carol Rose, 13 0  Eric Freyfogle,13 Fred Bosselman, 3 2 and John
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993) (reviewing of the
implementation of the ESA and demonstrating that through implementation, "the
agencies... have converted an act of specific stages and clear commands into an act of
discretion"). Houck's work also highlights the disjuncture between public perceptions of
the ethic or strength of the ESA and its practical force.
125. Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean
WaterAct and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 773 (1989).
126. In the lecture, Oliver A. Houck, Are Humans Part of Ecosystems, 28 ENVTL. L. 1
(1998), Houck addresses a question of values directly: the critical question of how to
incorporate human values without overwhelming the possibility of ecological integrity as we
implement the concept of ecosystem management.
127. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.12 A (1986) (describing
the basic message of 404 as "no discharge" but providing examples of "utilitarian holdings"
that "take the sharp edge off' section 404 and highlighting effect of multiple loci of
decisionmaking and incrementalism that characterize 404).
128. Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (2001)
129. Rachlinski, ProtectiongEndangered Species, supra note 121.
130. Rose, supra note 117, at 742-46; Rose, supra note 106, at 7-11.
131. See, e.g., Eric Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77
(1995) (demonstrating the way in which property law reflects society's environmental ethic
and tracing the evolution of the American frontier ethic into a market ethic, and the
relationship of this ethic to the development of property and takings law, separated from the
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Sprankling 5 have all made significant contributions, building on
earlier work by James Karp13 4 andJohn Humbach. 
1 5
One could reasonably argue that the clearest lens on society's
environmental ethic is the common law of property. But while this
work may be a logical starting point, it cannot substitute for a focus
on the ethics embedded in statutes. The limitations of the
common law have made statutory law a significant part of the
landscape, a circumstance likely to remain unchanged for the
foreseeable future. There is no assurance that the ethics
embedded in our statutes are identical to those found in the
common law, so the inquiries are not redundant. And it seems that
the contentious realm of environmental law and policy could
benefit enormously, even disproportionately, from the effort to
obtain greater clarity about its ethical dimensions. 
3 6
There are a few ethics analysts who have focused specifically on
environmental statutes and who have undertaken partial analysis of
the ethics that underlie our environmental statutes and the
statutes' implementation. Holly Doremus has focused on
uncovering the conservation values that were motivating forces for
the passage of some of our core environmental statutes. Her work
advocates restoring these values. Doremus focuses on the vision
that guided the legislators and advocates who shaped our major
conservation statutes.17  She looks to the roots of the law and
realm of federal statutory environmental law).
132. Bosselman, supra note 80.
133. Sprankling, supra note 80.
134. James P. Karp, Aldo Leopold's Land Ethic: Is an Ecological Conscience Evolving in Land
Development Law?, 19 ENVrL. L. 737 (1989).
135. John A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339 (1989).
136. Some may argue the opposite point: that at least in the realm of environmental
policy, unlike in property, the connection to environmental ethics is apparent and thus the
work is not as imperative. However, as noted supra Part I, I believe that a close look at the
law as it exists today reveals scant attention, beyond lip service, to an ethic that is truly
environmental.
137. In Nature, Knowledge and Profit: The Yellowstone Bioprospecting Controversy and the Core
Purposes of America's National Parks, Doremus documents the values that may explain our
commitment to certain resource protection statutes and programs. 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401
(1999). In particular, Doremus highlights the statutory commitment to the inspirational
value of the national parks. Id. at 444. In Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being
Wild, Doremus searched for values at the core of the ESA. 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
She identifies the value of wildness and the ethical impulses potentially represented in the
statute from legislative history, and the statement of goals in the introductory sections of the
statute. Id. at 10-15. In the course of measuring the Department of Interior's relevant
incidental take rules against this value, Doremus discusses the balance of various values-
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argues for preserving the values embedded there."" This approach
contributes to identifying the ethics embedded in the law, but it
doesn't consider in detail what values emerge in the
implementation of the statute. Eric Freyfogle addresses the
challenge of assessing the ethics of our laws in The Ethical Strands of
Environmental Law, focusing on the general approach taken by
Congress in select statutes and the values identified in their
aspirational statements of goals.13 9 This work opens the dialogue
about the ethics embedded in our existing laws, but does not take
as its focus detailed development of this understanding and its
potential to alter the fabric of the discourse about law. There are
many other scholars whose work integrates an exploration of
questions of underlying values, although the attention to the
questions of ethics or values is less central. For example, James
Huffman's work, advocating greater recognition of the autonomy
values embedded in our commitment to private property, engages
in a critique of broad reliance on environmental regulation based
in his reading of the values that motivate and underlie these laws.' 4°
Huffman has also catalogued the various ethical theories that can
be advanced as the "ethic" underlying the Endangered Species Act
and concluded that none fit particularly well.'4 ' Douglas Williams's
work on natural resource damage assessment provides a critical
including protection of human life, landowners' autonomy and control over their property,
and local community voice-found in the regulations. Id at 44-49.
138. Doremus, Nature, Knowledge and Profit supra note 137, at 438-42; Restoring Endangered
Species, supra note 137, at 48. In Nature, Knowledge and Profit, Doremus presents legislative
history and other materials from the late nineteenth century that reveal a commitment to a
vision of parks as places of spiritual renewal. The early advocates of the national parks
system believed that this spiritual renewal would inculcate environmental ethics among the
visitors to the parks. From the early period, they also show how cheap theatrical
manipulation compromised these loftier values espoused by park advocates. In Restoring
Endangered Species, supra, Doremus critiques Interior Department endangered species
reintroduction policies and practices for their biological risk and because they conflict with
what Doremus sees as the overriding goal of the ESA:- wildness.
139. Freyfogle, supra note 8, at 833-40. Freyfogle notes the naivet6 of the early efforts to
protect non-human nature in statutes like NEPA and the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield
Act. He notes Congress' perception of the environmental challenge as an information
problem and the lack of any real understanding even of the goals articulated in the statutes.
He also focuses on the failure to change land law to incorporate our understanding of
ecology and interdependence as a critical failing. Id.
140. See James L. Huffman, The Public Interest in Private Property Rights, 50 OKLA. L. REV.
377 (1997) (analyzing the turn to regulation as partly motivated by an objective of wealth
redistribution).
141. James L. Huffman, Do Species and Nature Have Rights?, 13 PUB. LAND L. REv. 51
(1992).
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reading of the rhetoric and values that support natural resource
damage valuation techniques employed under the Oil Pollution
Act and CERCLA1 42  Eileen Gauna, in the course of a critique of
existing models of regulatory decisionmaking, describes the ethical
approach embedded in each.14 3 Another example can be found in
Christopher Schroeder's Cool Analysis versus Moral Outrage in the
Development of Federal Criminal Environmental Law.14 Schroeder
obliquely addresses environmental ethics in applying the
dichotomy between the cool analysis approach to environmental
law and the moral outrage approach. 145 Victor Flatt addresses the
extent to which environmental values are inevitably excluded when
EPA employs cost-benefit analysis and proposes that a new
paradigm for decisionmaking must identify all values that underlie
our laws and provide agencies an analytical method for
incorporating all these values into decisions with transparency.
14 6
Dan Farber's work can also be cited as providing ethics analysis, in
that it uncovers instances where decisionmaking tools such as cost-
benefit analysis may advance a set of values or a particular ethical
impulse.1 47  Much of Farber's work focuses on the proper way to
142. See Douglas R. Williams, Valuing Natural Environments: Compensation, Market Norms,
And the Idea of Public Goods, 27 CONN. L. REv. 365 (1995). The article also includes a
thoughtful discussion of the difficulty of expressing environmental values through the norms
and currency of the market. Id. at 366-71.
143. See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm
Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 17-28 (1998). Gauna argues for the need for a new model
that can more successfully incorporate the value of fairness that is brought into focus by
environmental justice. Id. at 37-53.
144. Christopher Schroeder, Cool Analysis versus Moral Outrage in the Development of Federal
Criminal Environmental Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251 (1993).
145. Id. at 253-56. In the language of ethics, these could be characterized as a human-
centered utilitarian ethic versus a rights-based or intrinsic value environmental ethic. He
describes the apparent embodiment of the latter type of environmental ethic in many early
environmental statutes and yet the utilitarian thread often reflected in their implementation
through rules, permitting and then enforcement decisions. Id. at 258-60. The increased
attention to criminal enforcement can be explained as a return to a moral outrage
perspective. Id. at 266-68.
146. Flatt, supra note 8, at 15. Flatt suggests a decisionmaking paradigm for agencies that
would make the value identification and weighing process more transparent in individual
implementation decisions. See id. at 20-21.
147. For example, Farber surveys and acknowledges the shortcomings of cost-benefit
analysis as a tool to capture some kinds of values. Supra note 113, at 47-58. Viewed in this
light, Farber's work is closely related to the work of Cass Sunstein, Lisa Heinzerling and
economists such as Kip Viscusi. That work focuses on the appropriate analytic methods to
employ in setting environmental standards and goals. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997); Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
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deploy standard decisionmaking techniques when we are deciding
the appropriate level of risk to human life or health to tolerate and
not explicitly on questions of ethics.1 4 8 Errol Meidinger's work on
private certification as an increasingly significant complement to
regulation analyzes the values embedded in certification programs,
focusing on their implications for the environment, human rights
and community. 49 All of this work contributes something to the
broader discourse about the ethics underlying our law, but it rarely
locates itself in relation to any broader debate, perhaps because a
broad conversation is only now emerging.
Ultimately, the language of values and reasons for caring may not
yet be sufficiently developed to enable a robust discourse about the
ethics embedded in environmental law. Whether or not legal
scholars are the best suited to develop this language, contributions
are already being made in the literature. Further depth in the
analysis of the competing values and reasons for valuing embedded
in environmental law is an important element of the work ahead.
IV. THE SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
A. Method and Goals
Before describing a method for identifying the ethics embedded
in environmental law, it may help to describe in more detail the
goal of this project and its scope. Following this explanation, I
offer an abbreviated illustration of the type of analysis I envision,
focusing on the federal law of wetlands regulation.
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1553 (2002).
148. Farber argues that the same factors that make identification of our environmental
values challenging-uncertainty, long time horizons, and rapidly changing knowledge-also
justify adjustments to standard decisionmaking tools, like cost-benefit analysis and burdens of
proof. Compare infra Part IV with FARBER, supra note 113, at 5-6.
149. Errol E. Meidinger, "Private"Environmental Regulation, Human Rights, and Community,
7 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 123 (1999-2000). His work suggests that lack of transparency limits our
ability to determine the values embedded in certification programs. He also notes the
impact that certification regimes can have in shaping laws. See also Errol E. Meidinger,
Environmental Cert/ifcation Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer Than You May Think, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,162 (2001). Meidinger also makes an interesting observation on the
competitive evolution of certification programs "to define master social metaphors, such as
ecosystem health, sustainability, and corporate responsibility." Id. at 10,164. This process
directly affects the dialogue about environmental ethics, by providing meaning to some of
the dominant words and phrases widely used in the discussion.
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As is stated above, the narrow goal is to explore how we might
gain a better sense of the values embedded in our statutory-based
environmental law and to identify ethics or ethical impulses that
these statutes seem to reflect. The goal is not, however, to produce
a single clear dispositive statement of "an ethic" that is reflected in
the law. Rather, the picture that emerges over time will itself be
dynamic. The precise contour of the ethics embedded in the law
will never be clear and perhaps never free from some dispute, but
many possible ethical underpinnings will be ruled out by a careful
analysis. Patterns of values that consistently appear can shed
considerable light on the ethics we currently embrace in our laws.'5°
As to the scope of the project, the work I envision requires an
analysis of not only the values that are reflected in statutory
language but also those that emerge when we study the law in
action-that is, in the law as implemented, interpreted and
enforced. Analysis directed to the statute alone, or to the statute
only as implemented by regulations, is useful and contributes to the
overall project, but the goal should be to look at the broader
context in which the law operates. While in theory every provision
of every environmental law could be analyzed, I do not believe the
effort to cast the net so broadly is warranted. But at the least, an
analysis of key provisions of significant statutes seems valuable.
Even with that limitation, what I propose is a project of tremendous
scope. It is not something that one scholar accomplishes, nor even
one generation'of scholars. But it is a framework project to which
many scholars-some intentionally, some coincidentally-can
contribute. 151
150. Even with this explicitly limited goal, one might dismiss the project as impossible,
given that even a single provision of law will not clearly embrace a single ethic, but rather
may be consistent with a number of different ethics, and that its implementation may lead to
still other understandings of the values and their relative priority. But this reality does not
negate the value of the work. Indeed, a single law may be consistent with two different and
competing ethics or it may appear to reflect several different ethics. Even narrowing the
possibilities to two or three plausible ethics and a limited array of relevant values can have
great value. Moreover, as the illustration below shows, the layers of analysis required may
reveal a pattern of certain dominant values that are emphasized at every stage of
implementation. Other values that appear as aspirations in the law may, in practice, have no
impact on the law's implementation. Thus a weighted assessment of the importance
accorded different values and the plausible explanations for why they are valued may enable
us to describe with some confidence the balance of values promoted by a statute, which in
turn may suggest a certain dominant ethic.
151. Part III describes the contributions of existing work by legal scholars and its
relevance to this broader project.
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What follows is a very abbreviated outline of what this work looks
like. It describes how one might try to identify the ethic embedded
in section 404 of the Clean Water Act, as implemented. The
illustration highlights how the vocabulary introduced above could
be deployed and how work already done by scholars contributes to
the analysis.
B. An Illustration
The federal law governing human alteration of wetlands,
centered in section 404 of the Clean Water Act, presents a
particularly difficult challenge for the scholar trying to unravel its
ethical roots because of the extensive sources that comprise it.
However, for the same reason, it provides a good illustration of the
different levels of work involved. As a first step, the statutory
command must be analyzed. 152 In addition, one must look at the
regulations promulgated by both the Corps of Engineers and EPA
pursuant to section 404,153 as well as the Interagency Memoranda of
Agreement regarding such important issues as sequencing.
54
Likewise, significant judicial decisions interpreting these agency
policies may also reveal the values that predominate in practice and
152. Section 404 operates as an exception to the general prohibition on discharges of
pollutants into navigable waters under section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act. Section
301(a) provides, "Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317,
1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2001). Section 404(a), which deals specifically with
discharge of dredged or fill material, provides:
The Secretary may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for
the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal
sites. Not later than the fifteenth day after the date an applicant submits all the
information required to complete an application for a permit under this subsection, the
Secretary shall publish the notice required by this subsection.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2001). This section, by virtue of the broad definition afforded
navigable waters under the statute and by regulation, reaches the discharge of dredged or fill
material into wetlands as well as open water. Hence the most common application of section
404 is to permit the filling of wetlands. Dispute about the jurisdictional reach of 404 was
heightened by the Supreme Court's decision in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
153. These regulations are found, respectively, in 33 C.F.R. Pts. 320-329 (2001) and 40
C.F.R. Pts. 230-233 (2001).
154. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the Army and the
Environmental Protection Agency Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under the
Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines (February 6, 1990) at
http://www.usace.anny.mil/inet/functions/cw/cecwo/reg/mitigate.htin (last visited Oct.
17, 2002).
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shed light on why we care about these values. There may also be
related statutes, such as the Swampbuster incentive programs for
agricultural interests to preserve wetlands, that should be
addressed. Finally, one would look at the implementation of
section 404 in practice, an exercise Professor Oliver Houck
undertook in part in his detailed study of the implementation of
alternatives analysis under the regulations.5 5  This information
would bring into focus not just the ethics that are compatible with
the commands of the statute as drafted, but the ethics of the law as
implemented by the relevant agencies exercising the discretion
granted them. The importance is not in any one segment of such a
detailed analysis, but in the picture that emerges from the whole.
When one first looks at section 404(a) in isolation, it simply
modifies the general prohibition on discharges of pollutants into
navigable waters under section 301 (a). 6 However, 404(a) has little
meaning in isolation, since the remaining sections of the statute,
the regulations, etc., guide and constrain the Secretary's discretion
in granting permits. One would therefore analyze each of the
subsections of 404 to try to evaluate the values they serve and
plausible ethical justifications for advancing these values. The goal
would be a cumulative analysis of the values advanced by all steps
and elements of the decisionmaking process. One would look at
the guidance on specification of disposal sites under 404(b), the
restriction of disposal sites authorized by 404(c), the provision of
general permits under 404(e), and the exemptions carved out in
404(f), with an eye to elaborating the values promoted by each
section and to deriving the plausible justifications for protecting
each bundle of values.
The 404(b) guidelines of the Corps and the EPA provide
extensive material for analysis. 157  For example, 33 C.F.R. §
320.4(a) (1)1 s incorporates cumulative analysis of impacts and a
155. Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 773 (1989).
156. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2001).
157. I skip analysis of the text of 404(b) for purposes of simplifying this example and
concentrate instead on the regulatory guidelines implementing 404(b), since these
regulations flesh out in greater detail the values hinted at in the statute.
158. The regulation states:
The decision whether to issue a permit will be based on an evaluation of the probable
impacts, including cumulative impacts, of the proposed activity and its intended use on
the public interest. Evaluation of the probable impact which the proposed activity may
have on the public interest requires a careful weighing of all those factors which become
[ ol. 28:1
In Search of an Environmental Ethic
broad inclusive balancing that includes many different values, some
of which are consistent with a number of different possible
justifications for caring. Many are clearly human-centered values:
economics, aesthetics, historic properties, flood hazards, land use,
navigation, recreation, water supply and conservation, energy
needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral needs,
consideration of property ownership and the needs and welfare of
the people. Others may reflect either an anthropocentric or a
biocentric concern: conservation, general environmental
concerns, wetlands, fish and wildlife values, floodplain values, shore
erosion and accretion, and water quality.
Some of these values could arguably indicate a reason for caring
consistent with a Sustainability Impulse, but concern for future
generations is at best implicit and is not necessarily promoted at all.
The values considered also arguably go beyond the range that
would be considered under a Nuisance Impulse. The regulation's
list of values combines some that might be protected by a nuisance
action with valuing of fish and wildlife, general environmental
concerns and wetlands. However, looking at the limits of the
analysis demanded, including the limited extent to which the
values mentioned even arguably reflect a concern for the ecological
values represented by wetlands and their interdependence with
upland areas, as well as the absence of explicit direction to analyze
the impacts at a variety of scales and consider resilience and
surprise, it appears that the impulse is not consistent with what I
relevant in each particular case. The benefits which reasonably may be expected to
accrue from the proposal must be balanced against its reasonably foreseeable
detriments. The decision whether to authorize a proposal, and if so, the conditions
under which it will be allowed to occur, are therefore determined by the outcome of this
general balancing process. That decision should reflect the national concern for both
protection and utilization of important resources. All factors which may be relevant to
the proposal must be considered, including the cumulative effects thereof: among
those are conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns,
wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain values,
land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water supply and
conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber production, mineral
needs, considerations of property ownership and, in general, the needs and welfare of
the people. For activities involving 404 discharges, a permit will be denied if the
discharge that would be authorized by such permit would not comply with the
Environmental Protection Agency's 404(b)(1) guidelines. Subject to the preceding
sentence and any other applicable guidelines and criteria (see §§ 320.2 and 320.3), a
permit will be granted unless the district engineer determines that it would be contrary
to the public interest.
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2001).
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have termed the Ecological Utilitarian Impulse. Taken as a whole,
this seems to fit better under the broader, traditional utilitarian
ethic. Current use and current protection are given equal weight
to the extent the values identified are served. Moreover, the
explicit mention of property ownership shows the consideration of
a broad range of human interests in the land, not merely those
related to particular economic activities, but also the more abstract
interest in the exercise of control and limitation of governmental
action. Therefore, a general human-centered utilitarian ethic
seems to better describe the cost-benefit balance mandated by this
section.15 9
One would also consider the rarely used section 404(c) veto
authority that permits EPA to restrict or deny any disposal site
when it determines that the discharge of such materials into the
area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water
supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and
breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.
The values embedded in this authority to prohibit disposal tend
largely toward a human-centered ethic. The privileging of
municipal water supplies, shellfish beds, fishery areas and
recreational areas bespeaks a clear anthropocentrism. It appears to
reflect a part of a pure utilitarian calculus within the broader
utilitarian assessment of permissible disposal sites. It would appear
that Congress identified here a small number of values that so
affect human welfare that threats to them justify authorizing a
complete bar on disposal in a given location. However, the
consideration given to "wildlife" is potentially compatible with a
slightly broader ethic, even a modified biocentric utilitarian' Go or a
rights-based ethic that privileges the interests of life forms
encompassed by the term wildlife. But, given that "wildlife" often
refers to those species which humans hunt, observe recreationally
and consume, the term seems again to embody a human-centered
159. "The benefits which reasonably may be expected to accrue from the proposal must
be balanced against its reasonably forseeable detriments." Id. The ultimate standard
applied, requiring the granting of a permit unless contrary to the public interest or in
violation of EPA's regulations, reinforces the social utility calculus. Id.
160. There is debate among philosophers on the coherence of an ethic that seeks to
account for the greatest good of non-human species, in light of our inability to know from
the non-human species member's perspective what constitutes "the good." Some respond to
this challenge by identifying a series of core goods such as survival, the avoidance of pain,
and the ability to reproduce.
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ethic, and unacceptable interference with these activities again
points to the contours associated with a human-centered utilitarian
ethic. Thus the section could be argued to be consistent with a
predominantly human-centered utilitarian ethic.
But when 404(c) is contrasted with a truly comprehensive
anthropocentric utilitarian analysis, particularly one informed by
ecology, this section appears more in line with what I have termed a
Nuisance Impulse. It singles out interference with certain
economic activities in private or public areas as warranting
prohibition. The standard prohibiting disposal where it would
cause "unreasonable adverse effects" on these activities (fishing,
hunting, recreation, provision of drinking water) would seem to
replicate a nuisance standard. The rarity with which 404(c) has
been invoked would have to be evaluated, however, and a close
look at the instances where it has been applied may suggest a
strong ecological ethic that conflicts with this more superficial
statutory reading. This highlights the importance of analysis of the
law's implementation, not merely its text.
After undertaking a complete analysis of the relevant regulations
one would also look at the practices of the agencies that implement
and enforce 404, to see if these practices reflect any new or
different values, or reasons for caring about identified values. In
the case of section 404, one could draw on the work done by
Professor Houck and others that reveals how certain mandatory
and discretionary elements of the analysis under the statute and
rules (and the values embedded therein) are ignored.' 6' From all
of this analysis, one could derive a statement of the dominant
values that the statutes promote and how these relate to
identifiable environmental ethics.
Without continuing here, this illustration shows one approach,
though not necessarily the only one, that one could take to try to
advance our understanding of and promote discourse about the
ethical content of our environmental statutes, tying together the
traditional legal analysis with a new attention to embedded values.
Since the provisions seem to be animated by a human-centered
utilitarian ethic, much of the debate over environmental laws today
may be misfocused. If our environmental statutes merely reflect
this utilitarian ethic (or what I have called a Nuisance Impulse), it
161. See, e.g., Houck, supra note 125.
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would appear that a vast gulf separates many people's self-image as
people committed to the environment from the reality of their
commitment to their own self-interest and self-preservation.
16
2
Furthermore, discourse that suggests that current environmental
law entails a radical privileging of non-human life would appear
clearly wrong and misleading. The increasing calls to embrace a
Sustainability Ethic would appear not as a small step, but as one
that might require a significant shift in our laws and the values we
pursue through them. Insights of this sort do not resolve the
question of where our values as individuals and a society lie and
how we can achieve them, nor are they prescriptive. But
description of the ethics we currently advance through our laws
could provide some landmarks from which to navigate as we move
ahead.
V. WHY STUDY THE ETHICS EMBEDDED IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS?
The study of ethics and law is not novel. Topics and situations
that challenge our ethical impulses, requiring us to apply laws and
ethics to new situations, frequently provoke lively debate. So, with
the publicity surrounding Dr. Kevorkian's assisted suicides, the
ethics of euthanasia and our laws governing suicide and assisted
suicide came under close scrutiny, provoking much commentary
on our laws and policies, and their ethical content and
justification.163 Similarly, the phenomenon of Baby M generated
much public and expert debate over the ethical issues spawned by
reproductive technology as we deliberated as a society over the
appropriate legal responses.164 The decision in Bowers v. Hardwick
65
prompted renewed thought and deliberation on our law and ethics
as they relate to autonomy and human sexuality. And the advances
of DNA testing stimulated renewed debate over the ethics and legal
162. In Gallup polls taken in 1989, 76% of Americans polled considered themselves
"environmentalists." In 1999, this number had dropped to 50%. Public Agenda Online,
Environment: People's Chief Concerns, at http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/
pcc detail.cfm?issue-type=environment&list=5 (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
163. See, e.g. Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 599 (2000) (discussing the legal history of physician-assisted suicide and its
ethical and legal implications).
164. See, e.g. Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby M: International Perspectives on Gestational Surrogay
and the Demise of the Unitary Biological Mother, 5 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 193 (1996) (analyzing
surrogacy and in-vitro fertilization from both a legal and ethical perspective).
165. 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
[Vol. 28:1
In Search of an Environmental Ethic
rules related to the use of such information as evidence in jury
trials.
These challenges may arise from changing social mores, new
technology, or newly available information. Alternatively, a
perceived divergence between society's ethical intuitions and its
laws may provide the impetus for renewed discourse. In all of these
situations, this dialogue on ethical questions raised in a legal
context and on the ethics embedded in our laws is a valuable
development.
The language of the law and the substance of public debate over
environmental law both reveal scant attention to its ethical content.
Our environmental laws remain politically controversial and subject
to continuous debate over directions for reform. 166 Yet there is only
superficial discourse about the complex mix of values at stake. 67
This limited discourse does not reflect the richness of the
possibilities in this area. A number of environmental philosophers
have posited that the development of something we might call an
environmental ethic is a logical step to expect at this time in the
history of human (and particularly American) ethical
development.6  But one need not accept that a uniquely
environmental ethic is developing or will develop to agree that
since the 1970's we have been facing new issues that raise the
possibility of a uniquely environmental ethic. Support for valuing
conservation may reflect a profound change in the identity of what
we value and why.'69 Even a conscious rejection of a unique ethic
166. After a presidential campaign in 1988 in which both candidates sought to paint
themselves as environmentalists, Vice President Quayle's Council on Competitiveness
promoted controversial reform. The appropriate direction for reform became an issue,
albeit only superficially debated, that distinguished the candidates in the next two
presidential elections, and was an issue on which the Republican-controlled 104th Congress
sought to distinguish itself by its unsuccessful bid to radically reduce environmental
regulation.
167. The conflicts over the past ten years between advocates of greater protection for
private property ownership and advocates of endangered species and wetland conservation
represent what I believe is an exception, a major instance of fairly open discussion of
unresolved value conflicts. The property rights advocates advance arguments for individual
autonomy through economic activity in contrast to those promoting an array of values
associated with greater conservation of biodiversity. However, because the arguments for
conservation are supported by a wide variety of different ethics, the distinctions among
which are not often discussed, the values in conflict with human autonomy are not as clearly
defined, leading to a less productive debate.
168. RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS (1989); LEOPOLD, supra note 20.
169. See NASH, supra note 168, at 4-7 (1989) (describing the evolution of human ethics to
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regarding the environment would represent an important step.
Moreover, it is clear that not only environmental philosophers, but
a growing number of Americans have adopted a distinctly
170
environmental ethic.
One possible explanation for why little attention has been paid to
the ethical content of environmental law is that these ethics are
inchoate. Articulating an ethic in this area is relatively challenging,
involving-as environmental protection decisions do-complex
technical decisions, significant uncertainty, a focus on the impacts
of human actions on non-humans who may or may not be valued,
and issues that may have long-term effects that extend far beyond a
human lifetime.17 The complexity of environmental issues makes
determining the values served by any given law or regulatory
decision extremely difficult in many cases.1 7 1 Our limited
understanding of the natural processes we continually affect makes
uncertainty an unavoidable aspect of environmental decisions. The
fact of uncertainty complicates decisionmaking and can serve to
mask value choices, enabling advocates to shift the debate away
from values. The terms of the debate on many environmental
issues has also become polarized, making reasoned decisionmaking
more difficult for those who hear only the media debate or who
lack time or first-hand access to the facts related to policy issues and
must rely on others' judgment and characterizations. 17 3
encompass ever-widening rights for new groups of individuals or beings, and suggesting the
development of environmental ethics is the next step in this progression); LEOPOLD, supra
note 8, at 237-39 (framing the evolution of a land ethic in similar terms as a step in the
social evolution that once accepted, but now rejects, human slavery).
170. The increasing trend toward vegetarianism and the growth of the animal rights
movement, as well as the existence of radical environmental groups whose actions reject
dominant norms about the ordering of values, are examples that bespeak deliberate ethics.
171. Richard Lazarus's list of the salient features of environmental law in Lazarus, supra
note 12, at 745-48, is similar though with slightly different emphasis. He focuses on the
nature of the injuries involved which are (1) irreversible, catastrophic and continuing, (2)
physically distant, (3) temporally distant, (4) characterized by uncertainty and risk, (5) with
multiple causes, and (6) often of non-human, noneconomic character.
172. The command-and-control regulatory approach gives rise to decisons that are
particularly complex technically. See Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at
Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 395, 411-16 (1995).
173. See Michael Spangle & David Knapp, Ways We Talk about the Earth: An Exploration of
Persuasive Tactics and Appeals in Environmental Discourse, in EARTHTALK: COMMUNICATION
EMPOWERMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION 3, 20 (Star A. Muir & Thomas L. Veenendall
eds., 1996). Although Spangle and Knapp suggest that adopting a moral discourse in
debates over environmental issues produces polarization, this refers to extreme polarizing
rhetoric in support of a position, not analysis and explanation of parties' root values and
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At the same time, there has been a diluting of meaning, so that
the relative significance of "environment" is now on par with
"apple pie" or "motherhood.' 74 No one can say that they don't
support protecting the environment, and it may in fact be the case
that we are all in favor of it; people simply disagree on how much
to do so, or at what cost to other values.1 75 Nonetheless, this reality
effect-the absence of meaning when we talk about
environmentalism or "caring about the environment"-may
truncate discourse."" Unearthing the values of a given person or
group is more difficult and requires a subtler dialogue about
values. Unlike an issue such as abortion, where a given person's
position is generally fairly clear and accessible, notwithstanding
rhetoric, the rhetoric available to discuss "valuing the
environment" is not very enlightening. We lack a vocabulary as
well as a discourse on this topic.
All of these factors-complexity, uncertainty, polarization, and
the reality effect-tend to instill deep uncertainty in the general
public about environmental issues, thereby encouraging them to
reasons for caring.
174. David Easter, Activism in a Moderate World: Media Portrayals and Audience Interpretations
of Environmental Activism, in EARTHTALK, supra note 173, at 45-47, explains this
phenomenon, building on Hall's notion of ideology as the "reality effect" :
[Ideology involves] "the power to signify events in a particular way." To the extent that
this exertion of symbolic power goes unrecognized, the reality effect is achieved,
whereby meanings that are ideologically constructed become commonsensical-the
natural way of the world. Faced with an image or proposition imbued with the reality
effect, people's thought processes are short-circuited to elicit the response, "who could
imagine it otherwise?'"
We are drawn to wonder whether the notion of environmentalism has been enveloped
by this reality effect. Indeed, allegiance to environmentalism has become virtually
commonsensical in our culture. Acording to a 1992 Wall Street Journal/NBC News
poll, eight of ten Americans call themselves 'environmentalists' (J. Miller 1993, p.6). At
first blush, this seems like a heartening discovery after years of conservative hegemony.
At second blush, however, one has to wonder if the term has any meaning at all anymore.
Indeed, who could not consider themselves environmentalists these days?
Id. (emphasis added) (citingJ. Miller, The Wrong.Shade of Green, DOLLARS & SENSE, Apr. 1993,
at 6).
175. This was effectively captured in a flyer supporting a candidate for local office I saw
recently. The candidate's opponent was strongly identified with environmental protection
and the candidate was identified with development interests. The brochure stated:
Let's state the obvious: NO ONE WANTS DIRTY AIR OR WATER. To suggest any
candidate is pro-pollution is ridiculous. The environment is everyone's priority, but it
takes money to preserve and maintain it.... [I]n the long run, the healthier the
economy is, the healthier the environment.
176. Professor Delgado describes this as a consequence of the triumph of normativity
early in the development of environmental law. Delgado, supra note 8, at 1123-26.
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retreat from serious debate about environmental issues. This
tendency to retreat is exacerbated by the frequency with which
environmental problems are treated as technical problems, not
questions of value.17  This may result in excessive deference to
experts who make value choices for us all.17  Also, when we focus
excessively on a technical solution without having first correctly
identified the values at stake in a given situation, it is more likely
that the real "problem"-as experienced by the majority-has not
even been correctly diagnosed. If the problem is misdefined we
will more likely choose an inappropriate solution.1 7 9 So the process
of better value identification can serve to improve and guide
technical choices by ensuring that technical experts are given the
correct questions to answer.
An interesting exercise may be to compare the state of discourse
about the ethical issues underlying environmental law with the
discourse in an area of legal scholarship like criminal law that
possesses in much smaller measure the qualities I have just
described: a relatively short period of development that has
produced highly complex and technical regulatory law on subjects
about which there is a high degree of uncertainty and unresolved
social conflict and the potential for new ethical terrain.'8 Apart
from occasional novel scenarios that create the possibility for new
177. DESJARDINS, supra note 26, at vii-viii; see also Shrader-Frechette, supra note 58
(highlighting the value choices embedded in ostensibly technical decisions).
178. SeeDESJARDINS, supra note 26, at 4-5.
179. DesJardins states:
Approaching any serious environmental issue with the hope of discovering a technical
"quick fix" guarantees only a narrow and parochial understanding of what is at stake.
History testifies to the dangers inherent in this approach. Too often past technological
or scientific "solutions" have resulted in as many new problems as they have solved.
DESJARDINS, supra note 26, at 5.
180. Criminal law presents a contrast in terms of several of these attributes, including the
historic depth of the basic concepts that continue to characterize our law. It also lacks the
depth of regulatory and technical detail that characterizes environmental law, except on
certain issues such as mental health and the insanity defense, for example. However, like
environmental law, criminal law does cope with the problem of uncertainty in terms of
prediction about human behavior and our limited understanding of human behavior. To
some extent, of course, this is a feature of all law to the extent it seeks to influence human
conduct, but this is a particular concern in the realm of criminal law where mental capacity
and state of mind play such a central role. Collaborative work by social scientists,
psychologists and lawyers on certain issues like mental capacity and dangerousness is
common. The context in which these topics are studied reflects more of the characteristics
of environmental law.
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ethical terrain, debates over the ethical underpinnings of criminal
law today rarely raise new ethical issues.18'
Instead, discussion of the ethical or philosophical underpinnings
of the criminal law revisits debates about utilitarian versus
retributive philosophies of punishment. 2 These competing ethics
and the values they advance are often discussed not just by
philosophers but also by legal scholars and policymakers. In
criminal law scholarship, it is not uncommon for the ethical
justification for a particular rule or decision to be addressed by a
scholar as part of legal analysis; it is part of the mainstream of
criminal legal scholarship. Because the debate is grounded in
traditional philosophies long identified as the core ethical force in
this field, scholars are well versed in the subject. Either despite the
fact that the paths for arguing these issues are fairly well trod-or
because they are-discourse about the ethical theories thatjustify a
given law, sentencing approach or reform proposal is quite
common to mainstream criminal law scholarship.
8 3
It seems unlikely that a clearer sense of our values would solve all
the problems that plague debate on environmental issues-
polarization, meaningless rhetoric, obfuscation and an excessive
focus on the technical. But it is very possible that such a discourse
181. In those cases that do raise new ethical dilemmas, there are often new technology
and emerging social practices that create perceived threats to human safety or property. See,
for example, the debate surrounding assisted suicide.
182. The choice between utilitarian and retributive justifications for punishment, which
remains a central focus of debate today, revisits themes and arguments that have long been
associated with criminal law theory. The more basic question of what values the criminal law
seeks to protect appears not to be frequently asked, perhaps because the answer is well-
established and understood. Protection of the public from threats to life, autonomy and
property is the common goal of almost all criminal law. And the autonomy interests of the
criminal, along with concerns about fairness in the prosecution, sentencing and penal
processes must be balanced against these. These values form the ethical ground underlying
the criminal law under either major ethical theory: utilitarian or retributive.
However, where issues like the death penalty raise controversial questions of value, the
debate about values may be more rhetorical than meaningful, just as it is in environmental
law. Professor Dan Kahan suggests that arguments about deterrence and the death penalty
are actually not relevant or persuasive even to the participants who frame them. Instead they
argue about deterrence but avoid the fundamental moral question about the value of human
life on which they actually differ. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv.
L. REV. 413 (1999).
183. But cf GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW xix (1978) (suggesting that
"the refinement of Anglo-American criminal law and its underlying theory" were inhibited
by the prevalence of the utilitarian philosophy which dominated discourse). This does not
necessarily mean that the ethical roots and impact of laws were not evaluated, but that
scholars and policymakers failed to consider the value of alternative ethical approaches.
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could help to lessen the dominance of these problems and
promote democracy.
A. Clarity Can Counteract the View of Environmental Law As
Purely Technical
A study and discussion of the ethics of environmental law can
counteract the tendency to treat environmental problems as purely
technical or political. 8 4  The issues addressed and governed by
environmental law are ethical issues. Environmental law is itself an
important expression of social value. The adoption of laws in this
field reflects concern for values previously excluded or
inadequately weighed under our laws. As Professor DesJardins has
written:
The tendency in our culture is to treat [environmental and
ecological] ... issues as simply scientific, technological, or political
problems. But they are much more than this. These environmental
and ecological controversies raise fundamental questions about what
we as human beings value, about the kind of beings we are, about the
kinds of lives we should live, about our place in nature, and about the• 185
kind of world in which we might flourish.
Like the discussion of environmental issues, analysis of
environmental law often focuses on the scientific, technological,
political or legal dimensions rather than the ethical content of the
law.186  Environmental ethics often appears as a special topic
discussed in isolation, not as a part of the understanding of the law.
In the analysis of laws and regulations, we may detail how decisions
are made and by whom, and what factors are taken into account.
To identify the values that are embedded in the law's standards and
procedures requires that we go a step farther and conceive of the
problem as non-technical.
Professor DesJardins describes the dynamic through which the
public and policymakers may abdicate responsibility for the value
choices that environmental policymaking demands:
184. See Flatt, supra note 8, at 11-13.
185. DESJARDINS, supra note 26, at vii-viii.
186. The findings of Professor Kahan, see supra note 182, in the context of debates over
another controversial issue, the death penalty, also reveal the human tendency to avoid
difficult moral questions in favor of technical questions. He reports on research showing
that people who argue about whether evidence supports the conclusion that the death
penalty deters crime often do not find their own arguments persuasive. Id. at 436-39.
Rather the opposing views are grounded in fundamental disagreements about the value of
human life, which are less often aired. Id.
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For many people in our culture, and especially for many in policy-
making positions, science and technology offer the only hope for
solving environmental problems. Because environmental problems
often involve highly technical matters, it is only reasonable to turn to
experts in these technical areas for answers. Furthermore, since
science offers objective and factual answers in an area where
emotions run high and controversies abound, science seems an
obvious candidate from which to seek help with environmental
concerns.
Unfortunately, turning to science with the optimistic hope for a quick
fix is not very different from the pessimistic attitude. Each involves
individual citizens relinquishing the authority to make decisions
about their world.... Leaving environmental decisions to the
'experts' in science and technology does not mean that these
decisions will be objective and value-neutral; it only means that the
values that do decide the issue will be the values these experts
themselves hold.1
7
Explicit discussion of the values our laws affect is a necessary first
step to promote full public participation in resolving these
questions.
B. Clarity Can Promote More Democratic Law and Policy
Clearly, environmental laws and policies reflect normative or
value judgments. As a society, we are making decisions about right
and wrong, about priorities and imperatives, when we adopt
policies and rules. If neither the public nor the decisionmakers
articulate the ethical issues involved, we cannot ultimately know
whether our laws and policies are consistent with our ethics. Just as
in archery one learns from seeing where the last arrow struck and
adjusts one's aim, we need to know what the bulls-eye is for
environmental law, or else we're simply launching arrow after
arrow with only random improvement.
Further, both philosophers and some theorists of democracy
emphasize the possibility that deliberation promotes sound
development of values by the public. A more open process of
identifying and debating the values at stake may allow a fuller
development of the public's values. 8  Ethics can broaden our
187. DESJARDINS, supra note 26, at 4-5.
188. See KAGAN, supra note 30, at 21, for the proposition that people can change what
they care about through deliberation. Rehearsing the information in a careful way can lead
us to decide that some moral action is impelled even though it is not new information we
have received. Whether the information or arguments are fairly presented, though,
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ability to see and define the problem, by focusing us on what we
care about. Also, there may be a risk that environmental values will
not remain protected if they are poorly understood and articulated.
Essential to long-term environmental protection is a clear
understanding of the values that the laws serve. These values are
and will continue to be in conflict with other values. If they are
poorly articulated and understood, they can be too easily
trumped.18 9
C. Clarity Can Counteract Polarization and Resulting Obfuscation
The rhetoric of the environmental debate has become polarized,
making reasoned debate and decision more difficult.' 90 Those who
hear only the polarized debate and have no firsthand access to the
facts may simply shut down and ignore the issues as impossible to
resolve.' 9 The result is a reduction in democratic participation. Or
the participants in the debate and the public may be enveloped by
the "reality effect"' 192 of ideology, which can lead to an uncritical
expression of support for environmental values by everyone.
Human values that conflict with environmental values may simply
be ignored or marginalized in the debate, preventing the
development of a more nuanced statement of the ethics held by an
individual or group. Another dynamic can result when poorly
defined environmental values conflict with other values, such as
autonomy, or strong desires, like economic well-being.
Environmental values, poorly defined, can be marginalized by a
characterization as "extremist." 193 And the increased attraction of
quantification may lead to an effort to quantify all environmental
values to stay in the game.194
determines whether the discourse promotes serious reflection on the values involved or is
simply a cheap appeal to emotion. See id. at 21-23.
189. See Spangle & Knapp, supra note 173, at xiv.
190. SeeVandenbergh, supra note 8, at 861-64.
191. For example, the contending views about whether the greenhouse effect and global
warming were likely to occur created substantial public uncertainty. The debate over
whether there was a problem led many people to dismiss the debate as impossible for a lay
person to understand. While there are technical issues in the debate, many of the public
statements by partisans advocating a particular view could have been better understood had
the values that underlay the participants' conclusions been revealed.
192. See supra note 174 (on Hall's notion of the reality effect, discussed in EARTHTALK).
193. See Spangle & Knapp, supra note 173, at 3-26, for the use of extreme polarizing
dialogue by radical functionalists and radical environmentalists.
194. James Salzman et a., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN.
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Another incidental benefit of reduced polarization is its potential
to minimize the rapid pendulum swings through which policy in
this area seems to move. We seem to reel from extreme to
extreme, but with a veneer that there is no or little disagreement
about basic values.1 95 Pressure on non-human resources is likely to
continue to increase as population and human expectations for
improved well-being continue to increase. Technological advances,
the transition to the global economy and attendant economic
pressures create periods of economic transition, where controversy
over social values seems frequently to emerge. Strategies to
promote or oppose conservation that rest on the superficial
attachment the public has to charismatic megafauna and dramatic
human health threats on the one hand, and to job security on the
other, preclude the possibility of public expression of a more
deeply rooted and nuanced ethic.
D. Clarity Can Promote Conflict Resolution
Environmental law is an area of competing values where difficult
controversies and conflicts arise and will likely continue to
flourish.'9 In this setting, careful attention to the values promoted
by environmental law would provide us with valuable information.
Current discourse often relies on crude statements that don't
approach a discussion of the underlying values.197  The public,
ENVrL. L.J. 365 (2001); James Salzman, Currencies and the Commodifcation of Environmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REv. 607 (2000);James Salzman &J.B. Ruhl, Apples for Oranges: The Role of
Currencies in Environmental Trading Markets, 31 ENVIL. L. REP. 11,438 (2001).
195. President George W. Bush suffered from harsh public reaction to early policies that
represented a favoring of other values over the environment. In 1996 and 1992, Bill Clinton
was elected on a platform that promised a strong commitment to enhanced environmental
protection. But the 104th Congress, elected during Clinton's presidency, was noted for its
Contract with America and accompanying agenda to change policies on environmental
protections and enhance protection for economic interests and property owners. Only seven
years before, in 1988, George Bush and Michael Dukakis ran on platforms in which both
sought to characterize themselves as environmentalists committed to an environmental ethic.
196. Absent currently unforeseen technological advances, pressure on resources for
human use and for conservation will continue to grow as population and expectations
increase; therefore, conflict will likely remain with us and grow. Pressure on our natural
resources is unlikely to lessen measurably in coming years. Land, water and the resources
they contain are increasingly important and subject to pressure in a growing global
economy.
197. The coarseness of the current dialogue is not merely a consequence of the need to
accommodate media and public interest in soundbytes. It would be naive to expect open
discussion of environmental ethics to eliminate polarized debate in many fora, but it may
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advocates, decisionmakers, and scholars will be better able to
deliberate on the issues if they can identify and express what they
care about and why on a given issue. Statements can go beyond pat
political catch-phrases -whether a given proposal "will gut the
Endangered Species Act" or "put humans back ahead of animals
under the law"-by providing a broader discussion of the values
currently embedded in the statute as well as those in any reform.
Knowing the facts alone does not ensure that we can see how to
resolve a conflict consistent with our ethics. If I am correct in my
premise that many of these participants have only a poorly formed
understanding of the environmental ethics reflected in the existing
laws (and perhaps of their own values), this poor understanding
interferes with the ability to apply ethics to any particular conflict.
VI. CONCLUSION
Statutory environmental law and its implementation reflect and
embody important value choices that we make as a society. Public
debate and public opinion reflect the assumption that
environmental statutes represent a commitment to a new set of
values-to environmentalism. Closer attention to the question of
"the good" we are defining through this body of law may be an
important step in the ongoing evolution of law in this area. We can
no longer afford to retreat into the technical realm or maintain
superficial assumptions about the values embedded in our law.
This article argues that the continued maturation of a body of law
appropriate to our society's needs and values depends on greater
awareness of the values and ethics we currently embrace through
our laws. Perhaps someday we will see legislation requiring an
"Ethical Impact Statement" for all major federal environmental
legislation and budgetary actions and a "Values Analysis"
supplementing cost-benefit analyses for major regulations. But
awareness of the importance and nature of the inquiry we are
neglecting represents the first necessary step.
enrich the range of the debate. Even scholarly discussions often resort to crude
characterizations of the values that a law or proposal advances.
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